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NOTES
Rule 144: SEC Regulation of Dispositions of Securities
by Controlling Persons and Private Placees
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, dissatisfaction with the law that governs the disposition of securities by controlling persons' and private placees 2 under the
Securities Act of 1933 has been voiced in numerous commentaries.
Although criticism has been directed at varying facets of the problem,
the displeasure of critics has resulted from two fundamental objections:
first, the unnecessary ambiguity that heretofore has enveloped public
resale of privately placed securities and, to a lesser degree, resale of
securities by controlling persons; and secondly, the failure of the present
law adequately to effect the disclosure policy of the Securities Act of

19333 and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' Spurred by these
legitimate concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently rescinded rules 1545 and 1556 and in their place has adopted a
number of remedial rules and amendments.
1. Controlling persons are generally defined in terms of ability to direct the management
and policies of an issuer. See notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text. The consequences of control
are far reaching. Controlling persons, for example, are liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as the controlled issuer under the Securities Act of 1933 unless they had no knowledge
of or a reasonable ground to know of the facts that constitute the issuer's violation. Securities Act
of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)
(1970). See generally Sommer, Problems of Controlling Persons and Their Brokers, in FIRST
ANN. SECURITIES REGULATIONS INST. 25 (1969); Sommer, Who's in "Control"-SEC, 21 Bus.
LAw. 559 (1966). The problems of controlling persons with which this Note is concerned are those
relating to statutory and regulatory inhibitions of the Securities Act of 1933 on the resale of
securities, whether acquired on the public market or in a private transaction.
2. As used in this Note, the term private placees refers to those persons who have acquired
securities in an unregistered nonpublic offering from an issuer or a controlling person. See notes
30-51 infra and accompanying text.
3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1970).
4, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970). Foremost of the critics
has been Francis M. Wheat, past Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In 1967,
Commissioner Wheat was appointed to head a study group which was to examine the operation
of the disclosure provisions of the securities acts. The heart of the Study Group's report, submitted
in 1969, treated the problem of secondary distributions. In an effort to rid the area of its many
ambiguities and to bring it more in line with the disclosure policies of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
the group study recommended a number of remedial rules, the "160 Series." Many of the features
of Rule 144, as finally adopted, reflect those of the 160 Series. DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTs-THE WHEAT
REPORT (CCH ed. 1969). [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT].
5. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1970), rescinded, Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (1970), rescinded, Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
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Pivotal to these changes is Rule 144, 7 which brings the resale of
securities by private placees and controlling persons under a single regulatory scheme. In addition to lending a degree of predictability to a
former morass of confusion, the rule breaks substantially with precedent
by utilizing the improved reporting machinery of the 1934 Act to ensure
the availability of current public information during secondary sales by
controlling persons and private placees. Achieving this coordination has
required a dramatic shift in the construction of the 1933 Act by the

Commission and its staff. It is the purpose of the present inquiry to
evaluate in detail the new interpretive approach of Rule 144, and to

examine the mechanics of the rule, its component parts, and related
rules and amendments.
It is helpful at the outset to have some appreciation of the immense
importance of private placements and sales by controlling persons to the
well-being of the corporate community. The prohibitive expense of a
registered public offering has made the private placement an indispensa-

ble instrument for corporations that wish to raise moderate amounts of
capital.8 Private placements
emerging corporations seek
of the last five years, they
outstanding debt securities

have become the primary method by which
to raise "seed money," and, in at least one
have accounted for over 35 percent of the
sold in the United States It therefore is

apparent that any regulatory change in the disposition of privately
placed securities could have a profound impact on the vitality of the

corporate community. Similarly, the vast number of controlling persons
affected by Rule 144 can be readily appreciated by remembering that
the existence of every corporation presupposes the concomitant existence of at least one controlling person or group of persons.
7.

37 Fed. Reg. 591 (1972), to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 [hereinafter cited as Rule

144].
8. H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW 121 (1966). It has been estimated that the cost of
going public for a small business attempting to raise $1,000,000 through a registered public stock
offering could amount to 20% of the face value of the security. Note, Proposed SEC Rules for
Private Offerings: The Impact on Venture Capital Financing, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 122, 124 & n.
14 (1971); Private Placement. The "New" Money Game, 93 DUN'S REVIEW 81 (Feb. 1969).
9. The greatest volume of privately placed securities are debt instruments placed with insurance companies. In the 1960-63 period, for example, half of all new corporate bonds were privately
placed. At least one authority has remarked that "[p]rivate placement is still almost exclusively a
market for debt instruments, although there has been a small absolute, and a large relative, increase

in the amount of common and preferred stocks placed privately." FRIEND, LONGSTREET, MENDELSON, MILLER, & HEss, INVESTMENT BANKING AND THE NEW ISSUES MARKET 337 (1967); accord,
Address by George S. Chase, Salomon Brothers Seminar on Private Placements, Nov. 17, 1971.
See generally I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 689-96 (2d ed. 1961).
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II.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME FOR REGULATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION
OF SECURITIES

A.

Policy Considerations

The Securities Act of 1933 is designed to assure that the public
investor is given the benefit of "full and fair disclosure" regarding the
character of securities and the nature of business by all issuers who seek
financing through public offerings. 0 It is, however, initial public offerings, or distributions,1' with which the Act is primarily concerned-"the
flow of securities from the issuer through underwriters to the public
rather than with the subsequent buying and selling of these securities by
the public."' 12 Thus, most resales by nonissuers are characterized as
"trading" rather than as "distributions" and can therefore be freely
executed without the necessity of registration.
Beyond this statement of the general rule, the simplicity of the
trading-distribution distinction vanishes. There are, for example, two
kinds of subsequent resales by nonissuers that, if permitted without
registration, would subvert the disclosure policy of the Act. First, secondary distributions by controlling persons may "possess all the dangers
attendant upon a new offering of securities."' 13 Because of the possible
volume of such offerings, their market impact, the active solicitation of
buyers during such offerings, and the payment of high sales commissions, large volume resales by controlling persons clearly bear little
resemblance to normal trading and should be subject to the same disclosure requirements as imposed on initial distributions"-particularly
since the controlling status of the seller minimizes his burden of persuading the issuer to undergo registration.
Secondly, resales made by persons who have purchased securities
10. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74. The Preamble also states as one of
its purposes the prevention of fraud in connection with the sale of securities. The key fraud

provisions of the Act which implement this antifraud purpose are §§ 12(2) and 17. Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q (1970). Compliance with Rule 144 exempts the seller only from
the registration requirements of the Act. Both §§ 12(2) and 17 apply to the seller whether or not
he is exempted from the registration requirements of § 5.
I1. 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 551.
12. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
29, 36 (1959) (an excellent account by one of the 3 persons who penned the first completed draft
of the Securities Act during a weekend in April of 1933); 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 130.
13. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess., 13 (1933).
14. "Wherever such a redistribution reaches significant proportions, the distributor would
be in a position of controlling the issuer and thus able to furnish the information demanded by the
bill. This being so, the distributor is treated as equivalent to the original issuer and, if he seeks to
dispose of the issue through a public offering, he becomes subject to the Act." Id. at 13-14.
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from the issuer or a controlling person of the issuer in a private placement may frustrate the policy objectives of the Act. The inherent danger
in this kind of nonissuer resale arises from the suitability of the private
placement mechanism as a conduit for the distribution of unregistered
securities by the issuer or controlling person to the public. If private
placees were given unfettered freedom to resell securities purchased in
private placement, then issuers and controlling persons could avoid registration merely by altering their methods of distribution. Thus, while
the original private placement may not constitute a public offering, the
Act's disclosure policy requires carefully drawn restrictions on the resale
of privately placed securities.
Before examining the means by which the 1933 Act's disclosure
policy has been implemented, consideration should be given to certain
policies of the SEC and its staff in administering the Act. The SEC has
been given tremendous latitude to flesh out the skeletal provisions of the
Act and it can be fairly said that the ultimate realization of the Act's
disclosure policy rests upon the wisdom with which the Commission
exercises its interpretive and enforcement powers. 5 This statement is
particularly true of the Commission's power to regulate secondary sales
by controlling persons and private placees through its definition of such
key terms as "brokers' transaction," "distribution" and "controlling
person."'" The subtleties and ambiguities of the Act and the economic
consequences of a misinterpretation make it imperative that the Commission provide the securities bar with an empirically workable system
of regulations that ensures a high degree of certainty and predictability.
The Commission, however, is also charged with the full and effective
enforcement of the Act; this responsibility often calls for the propagation of flexible, or even vague, guidelines, in order to retain maximum
latitude to deal with those who would manipulate the mechanics of the
rules to subvert the spirit of the Act. 17 The dialectic of these two policies-certainty and predictability for the smooth operation of the Act
and flexibility for the effective enforcement of the Act-has played a
key role in the evolution of Rule 144.18
15.

WHEAT REPORT supra note 4, at 153-56.
16. Among the expressed powers given the Commission by § 19(a), is the authority to define
"accounting, technical and trade terms used in this title." 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970) (emphasis
added).
17. Cf SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd sub.
nom., SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959); Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C.
683 (1957).
18. See Schneider & Kant, Uncertainty Under the SecuritiesAct, 26 Bus. LAW. 1623, 163536 (1971).
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B.

Regulatory Structure

To permit the free and open trading of securities while preventing a
flow of initial and secondary distributions to the public without full and
fair disclosure, the 1933 Act and the rules promulgated thereunder provide an elaborate web of proscriptions and exemptions. The basic provision of the Act, section 5,19 makes it unlawful for any person to sell any
securities through the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails unless a registration statement relating to such securities is in effect. Expansive in
scope, this proscription embraces not only issuers, controlling persons,
and private placees, but all persons, whether trading in securities or
engaged in a distribution of securities.
Those upon whom the Act does not intend to place the burden of
registration, therefore, look beyond section 5 for relief. Their sanctuary
is provided by section 3,20 which exempts specified securities from the
requirements of section 5, and by section 4,21 which exempts specified
transactions. These two provisions exclude the vast majority of sales
from registration. Thus, the legislative intention to limit the disclosure
mechanism of section 5 to distributions is effected through a hybrid
method of "selective nonexclusion. ' 12 2 A significant result of this method
is that all persons seeking to sell securities, in whatever quantity or
manner, must find their own exemptions.2 That A's securities have
previously been the subject of exemption or registration is irrelevant to
the question whether A can now sell the same securities without registration. 2 A must find his own exemption or comply with the requirements
of section 5. Likewise, A's broker, who acts as an agent in executing
the sale, must find his own exemption. The Commission, moreover, has
long taken the position that the burden of demonstrating the presence
of an exemption rests on the person who is relying upon its availability.2
Section 4 and its related definitions provide the instrument by
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970).
22. Comment, Sales of Control Stock and the Brokers' Transaction Exemption-Before and
After the Wheat Report, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 475, 476 (1971).
23. Another significant consequence of this statutory scheme is that, with a few exceptions,
the exemptions of §§ 3 & 4 relieve the sellers only from the registration requirements of§ 5. They
do not exempt the seller from the antifraud provisions of §§ 12(2) & 17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q
(1970).
24. The only exceptions to this situation occur in relation to the limited varieties of securities
that are excluded from the coverage of the 1933 Act by § 3(2)-(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(2)-(Il) (1970).
1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 708-09.
25. Securities Act Release No. 4669 (Feb. 17, 1964).
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which Congress and the Commission have attempted to draw the rather

delicate lines between public and nonpublic offerings and between ordinary trading and distributions. This section exempts the following:

4(1) - Transactions "by any person other than an issuer, under"
writer, or dealer ....
transactions "by an issuer not involving any public offer4(2) ing,"
transactions by a dealer except those in certain close
4(3) relationship to a distribution, and

4(4)

-

unsolicited brokers' transactions executed upon a cus-

tomer's order.
The noncontrolling public investor, by virtue of section 4, is free

to sell his securities through his broker without registration. The investor is neither an "issuer," an "underwriter," nor a "dealer," and is
therefore exempt under section 4(1); his broker, moreover, although
unable to avail himself of section 4(1) since he is by definition a "dealer"
tinder section 2(13),s is exempt under section 4(3)27 or section 4(4).28

Obviously, the intricacies of section 4 can become far more puzzling, but elaboration is here necessary only with regard to private
placees and controlling persons. The section 4 exemption most often
relied upon by both these groups when reselling their securities to the
public is section 4(1). To come within section 4(1), however, each group

must demonstrate that it includes neither issuers, underwriters, nor deal26. "The term 'dealer' means any person who engages either for all or part of his time,
directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1970)
(emphasis added).
27. Section 4(3) exempts transactions by dealers. Excluded from the exemption, however,
are transactions taking place within 40 days after the securities have been registered and bona fide
offered (90 days if it is the first time the issuer has made a registered offering). Also excluded are
transactions in any unsold allotment being sold in a registration and not sold within the 40 or 90
days, and transactions during which a stop order under § 8 is in effect. Since it was not the intention
of Congress to prevent trading by public investors, even during the time that the securities are in
registration or subject to a stop order, § 4(4) was added to permit brokers to sell for customers
through normal trading activities. Thus a broker who is unable to sell stock as a dealer for his
own account during registration under § 4(3) may sell securities of the same issue for the account
of a customer in a broker's transaction under § 4(4). That the broker is a dealer to whom § 4(1)
is not available does not prevent his being a broker for purposes of § 4(4). Similarly, the
unavailability of § 4(3) when the securities are in registration or subject to a stop order does not
prevent the broker from selling the securities of a customer under § 4(4). Comment, supra note
22, at 489-91.
28. Note that even though the broker is also a "dealer" and therefore unable to avail himself
of § 4(1), his capacity as a dealer does not prevent his capacity as a broker from qualifying under
the § 4(4) exemption of brokers' transactions.
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ers. Thus emerges the key significance of section 2(1 1)'s definition of
an "underwriter." 9 Under section 2(11), a person is a statutory underwriter if he:
(I) purchases from an issuer "with a view to. . . the distribution"
of securities, or
(2) "offers or sells for an issuer" in connection with such
distribution, or
(3) directly or indirectly "participates" in such distribution.
Moreover, for the purpose of determining section 2(11) underwriter
status only, an issuer is defined to include "in addition to an issuer,"
any person "directly or indirectly controlling" the issuer. Thus, one who
purchases securities from an issuer or from a controllingperson, "with
a view to" distribution will become a statutory underwriter and therefore will not be able to rely on section 4(1) for an exemption. Further
significance of the section 2(11) definition should become increasingly
apparent in the following discussion of resales by private placees and
controlling persons.
C. Pre-Rule 144 Resales by Private Placees
The policy of the 1933 Act does not compel the registration of
"private offerings" as opposed to "public offerings." 3 As long as an
offering is limited to a small group of experienced and sophisticated
investors who "have a relationship with the issuer that gives them access
to the same information that would be in the form of a registration
statement,'3 imposition of the requirements of section 5 is unnecessary. The Act, therefore, provides the issuer with the section 4(2) exemption for any transaction "not involving any public offering." Although
4(2) is strictly an issuer's exemption, the Act also provides, albeit
through a tortured interpretive route, a similar private offering exemp32
tion to controlling persons.
The inherent danger of private placements as a method of distribution to the public necessitates a vigilant containment of the private
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (11) (1970).
30. Landis, supra note 12, at 37. In describing the intended scope of the Act, Landis remarked: "'Public offerings' as distinguished from 'private offerings' proved to be the answer. The
sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group of experienced investors,

was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal government. That bureaucracy, untrained in
these matters as it was, could hardly equal these investors for sophistication, provided only it was
their own money that they were spending." Id.
31.
32.

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
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offering exemption. To serve this end, the Act and the SEC restrict the
two fundamental elements of a private placement-the issuer's original
placement of securities with the group of private placees, and the subsequent resale of those securities by the private placees. Were either ignored, an unregistered distribution of securities to the public could be
accomplished. The first element of the private placement exemption
requires that no offeree be a person whose lack of sophistication and
unfamiliarity with the issuer place him in need of the Act's protection.3 The public-private offering dichotomy therefore, is resolved by
looking to the needs of the offerees and not merely to their numbers.34
Although the issuer's original offering may have been made to a
sufficiently limited number of sophisticated investors, thus satisfying the
first element, the preservation of the issuer's private offering exemption
will depend on whether the securities offered have come to rest in the
hands of the initially informed group or whether the private placees
serve as conduits for a wider distribution to persons in need of the Act's
protection. The securities "come to rest" if the private placees purchase
with an "investment intent" or without a view to distribution. An immediate effort by the private placee to resell his securities before they have
come to rest would cause his offerees to be included among those in the
original placement and thereby retroactively jeopardize the issuer's section 4(2) exemption, and the private placee would himself become a
section 2(11) underwriter for whom the section 4(1) exemption would
not be available.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 144, the SEC's determination that
the private placee was an underwriter when he resold his securities
usually meant that he came within the first of section 2(1 1)'s three
disjunctive conditions: the purchase of securities from the issuer "with
a view to . . . [their] distribution." As applied to the private placee,

"distribution" is the antithesis of "holding for investment." To avoid
statutory underwriter status the reselling private placee therefore had to
33. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
34. The number of offerees is relevant "only to the question whether they have the requisite
association with and knowledge of the issuer which make the exemption available." Securities Act
Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). Among other factors are the size of the offering, facilities used
in making the sale, and the number of units being offered. Id. See generally Hill York Corp. v.
American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Gilligan, Will & Co., 38
S.E.C. 388 (1958), affd, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); H.
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, at 121-34; 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 653-65. As in the area of resales
by private placees, the requirements relating to the original placement in a § 4(2) private offering
have been fraught with confusion and vague guidelines. There have been indications that the SEC
will attempt to clarify this area by more precise guidelines. BNA SECURITIES REG. & LAW REP.
No. 140, A-I (Feb. 23, 1972).
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demonstrate that, at the time of his purchase from the issuer, he took
with a view to holding for investment.3 If after making his resale, the
private placee were deemed to have purchased from the issuer with an
improper "view," exemptions evaporated: the purchaser lost his 4(1)
exemption because he had purchased from an issuer with a view to
distribution; retroactively, the issuer's exemption was jeopardized, since
the securities never came to rest in the purchaser's hands; 36 and any
broker who helped in either sale lost his 4(3) and 4(4) exemptions since
37
his participation in the distribution made him an underwriter.
The crucial determination of "underwriter" status turned almost
entirely on the subjective state of mind of the purchaser. The requisite
state of mind was suggested by the purchaser's subsequent conduct-what he actually did following his purchase was evidence of what
he intended to do at the time of purchase. Absent a change in circumstances that might explain a departure from original intent,3 a sale
promptly after an investment purchase was evidence that the holder
purchased with a view to distribution. 9 Conversely, the passage of a
35. Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970).
36. Id. Since the issuer has an obvious interest in restricting resale by its private placees, it
has been customary for it to insist on a letter of investment intent from each of its placees.
Additional precautions include the issuance of stop-transfer instructions to prevent the transfer of
the securities and a legend stamped on the face of the certificate stating that the securities have
not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and may be offered and sold only if registered
or if an exemption from registration is available. Although the Commission has made it clear that
the self-serving "letter of intent" will not conclusively establish the proper investment intent, failure
to utilize these precautions is evidence of the absence of proper intent. Securities Act Release No.
5121 (Dec. 30, 1970). This policy has been continued with the introduction of Rule 144. The
Commission has stated that failure "to inform the purchaser fully as to the circumstances under
which he is required to take and hold the securities" constitutes a violation of § 17(a) of the 1933
Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Securities Act Release No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972).
37. Note that once a broker becomes an underwriter he cannot at the same time claim broker
or dealer status for purposes of § 4(3) or § 4(4). To permit otherwise would subvert the policy of
the Act. Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 604 (1946). In contrast, if statutory underwriter status
is avoided, the broker is both a brolker and dealer and can use either § 4(3)'s dealer's exemption
or § 4(4)'s broker's exemption when appropriate. See note 27 supra.
38. The change of circumstances doctrine permitted the private placee to sell his securities
before the normally accepted holding period had expired without having the sale discredit his
original investment intent. The theory was predicated on the occurrence of intervening factors
unforeseen or not easily foreseeable by the private placee and of such proportions that they
compelled the departure from an original investment intent. Morrow, The Investment Letter
Dilemma and Proposed Rule 144: A Retreat to Confusion, II SANTA CLARA LAW. 37 (1971). The
doctrine was strictly applied and the change generally had to be both material and extraordinary
in nature. Moreover, although the doctrine worked to excuse the necessity of holding, the shorter
the securities were held the more dramatic the'change of circumstances had to be. Merrifield,
Private Placement Exemption, 4 REv. SEc. REG. 943 (1971).
39. Note, The Investment-Intent Dilemma In Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1043 (1964).
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sufficient period of time or the occurrence of a sufficiently compelling
change of circumstances permitted the purchaser of investment securi-

ties to sell all his holdings without having his resale considered as evidence of an original intention to distribute. 0

The period of retention necessary to free privately placed, or "lettered," stock was never certain. Against a backdrop of official insistence
that the duration over which securities were held was only evidentiary

and not in itself conclusive,41 the proper length of the "holding period"
became an elastic concept of intolerable caprice. Without any available
administrative interpretation, the securities bar snatched at any official
utterance that suggested the existence of a precise talisman. At one
point, the period was thought to be one year;4" later, a casual remark

by Commissioner Cohen that hinted the acceptability of a two-year
holding period was promptly adopted as a standard by the bar;43 subsequent experience, however, indicated that the SEC staff would not issue
a favorable "no-action" letter unless privately placed securities had been
held by the investor for three years or more.44 To this confusion were
added further uncertainties relating to the "change in circumstances"
doctrine and the severity of the change necessary to permit resales
without registration by the private placee prior to the expiration of the
40. "The normal scenario for the sale of restricted stock in the public markets adheres to
the following script. The seller stockholder obtains an opinion of counsel justifying the desired sale
and submits this opinion to company counsel. If the latter approves the opinion, he instructs the
transfer agent to remove the legends and 'stop transfer' orders from the securities in question. This
entire process takes no more than a few days to effectuate." Lowenfels, SEC "No-Action" Letters:
Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. RaV. 1256, 1264 n.46 (1971). The
problem arises when company counsel will not accept the proffered "opinion letter." Prior to the
adoption of Rule 144, the private placee was then forced into the arduous process of seeking a
"no-action" letter from the SEC. The release announcing the adoption of Rule 144 states that the
staff will no longer issue any "no-action" letters relating to resale of privately placed securities.
Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). It is hard to believe that Rule 144 has so clarified
the area of resales by private placees whose opinion of counsel is rejected by the company. The
release does state that the staff will issue "interpretive letters to assist persons in complying with
the new rule." It remains to be seen whether interpretive letters will adequately alleviate the
potential hardship.
41. "[T]he longer the period of retention, the more persuasive would be the argument that
the resale is not at variance with an original investment intent, but the length of time between
acquisition and resale is merely one evidentiary fact to be considered." Securities Act Release No.
4552 (Nov. 6, 1962); Accord, Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957). See also Lowenfels,
supra note 40, at 1258-59.
42. United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Brooklyn Manhattan
Transit Corp., I S.E.C. 147, 162-63 (1935) (holding period under § 3(a)(l 1) intrastate exemption);
Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
43. 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 671-72.
44. See Lowenfels, supra note 40, at 1258-59.
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holding period.15
Holders of investment securities were further plagued by the "fungibility doctrine." Under this concept, all securities of the same class
were assumed to be equal or interchangeable regardless of their certificate numbers or the time at which they were purchased. Although never
the subject of an official ruling or interpretative release," the fungibility
doctrine caused securities purchased on the market to bear the same
taint as securities of the same class acquired in a private offering. Thus,
any person who sold publicly acquired securities immediately after acquiring the same class of securities in a private placement would be
deemed an underwriter even though the actual certificates sold had been
purchased in a public transaction.
The uncertainties and ambiguities created by the imprecise holding
period, the change of circumstances rule, and the fungibility doctrine
were lamented by the bar and the Commission. The bar found it
virtually impossible to provide clients with satisfactory advice. Paradoxically, this particular grievance was felt most acutely by the expert
securities lawyers who were most familiar with the intricate pitfalls of
the private offering. Moreover, few among knowledgeable lawyers rendering a good faith judgment on a given problem would draw the same
conclusion. "Opinion shopping" was widely engaged in by purchasers
seeking an opinion on the availability of an exemption. Given that the
more informed attorneys would have the greater propensity to express
reservation, opinion shopping tended to place a premium on ignorance
of the law." For the private placee, the confusion unnecessarily impaired
the liquidity of his investment. For the Commission, the vagaries precipitated a growing volume of requests for "no-action" letters. Not only
did the administrative burden of responding place an unnecessary strain
on the staff, but inconsistent responses to the requests jeopardized the
staff's credibility.49
The dissatisfaction with the subjective intent-oriented approach to
resales by private placees went far beyond the confusion it created. As
a realistic construction of the statutory language, the approach was a
contrivance:
[T]he entire mystique of investment intent is generally unresponsive to reality and
45.
ings," 23
46.
Laws, 27
47.
48.
49.

See Kennedy, The Case of the Scarlet Letter or The Easy Way Out on "Private OfferBus. LAW. 23 (1967).
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 4, at 174; Samet, The Concept of Fungibility in Securities
Bus. LAW. 383 (1972).
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 4, at 164-74.
For an explanation of why "opinion letters" are necessary see notes 36 & 40 supra.
Schneider & Kant, supra note 18, at 1630.
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unrelated to the way people actually think and act. Virtually no one buys a marketable security as he would an heirloom, without contemplating the possibility of sale
at some future date.50

When immediately before acquiring his securities a private placee asked
his attorney the inevitable question: "How long must I hold before I am
permitted to resell?" the attorney was in an awkward position. Logically, the lawyer must have insisted that the question be retracted, because if it were not, the private placee would have manifested a preconceived intention to sell which no holding period could cure. Additionally, the attorney had to confess that even later, when the question could
5
properly be asked, no definite answer would be possible. '
The SEC's construction of the private placement also failed to
effect the policies of the 1933 Act. Through the private placement exemption a large volume of securities came on to the market without
attendant disclosure. Moreover, the existence of a holding period or a
change in the investor's circumstances bore little relationship to the
public's need for disclosure. From the disclosure viewpoint, it made
little difference whether a large block of securities were dumped on the
market by a private placee three months, six months, or three years
after the initial purchase from the issuer or controlling person.
D. Pre-Rule 144 Dispositions By Controlling Persons
1. Definition of Control.-Attempting to identify "control" is
one of the more thankless exercises required by the 1933 Securities Act.
Although it attaches immense consequences to that status, 2 the Act
provides no definition. Two tests, of marginal utility, are available. Rule
405 provides the first:
[T]he term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled by" and
"under common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.'1

The second test asks: what individual or group has the power to cause
the officers and directors to sign a registration statement? This test is
appropriate because only an issuer can execute and file a registration
statement.54 Within these broad boundaries lies a vast wasteland, with
isolated clues to be gleaned from case law.
50.

Id.

51. Schneider & Kant, supra note 18.
52. See note 1 supra.
53. SEC Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405() (1971).
54. Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007
(1970); Frank, Sales of Securities by "ControllingPersons" Under the FederalSecurities Act, 14
HASTINGS L.J. 137, 139 (1962).
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Since the Commission presumes the existence of control as Rule
144's point of departure, an extended treatment of control is here not
intended. It is sufficient that the plight of the security holder of uncertain status be noted. In determining whether a security holder is a
controlling person, it must be noted that control can be formal or informal, direct or indirect, can exist by virtue of a contract, office, security
holdings, relationship to a controlling person, or inclusion in a controlling group (none of whose several members would be controlling if
removed from the group).15 The power to control is sufficient; it need
not be exercised. In addition, the security holder's ascendancy to control
may be fortuitous as well as intentional. To indulge in literary license,
some holders, it seems, are born to control, some achieve control, and
some have control thrust upon them.
2. Consequences of Control.-The characterization of a security
holder as a controlling person serves to define the peripheral reach of
the Act's requirement that when practicable, full, accurate, and current
information be made available to the public during any sizable distribution. Consequently, the Act permits the unregistered sale of a sizable
block of publicly acquired securities held by a noncontrolling person,
but it may require registration if the same or a smaller block is being
sold by a controlling person. This distinction, which is most apparent
when control exists by virtue of an executive position, seems well
founded, since the leverage necessary to compel the issuer to register the
securities should be imputed only to a controlling person."
-The 1933 Securities Act regulates dispositions of securities by controlling persons through its definition of statutory underwriter in section
2(11). For the sole purpose of identifying an underwriter, section 2(11)
defines "issuer" to include any controlling person. Thus, a broker who
may be selling securities for an
for a controlling person
sells securitiesconnection
with a distribution and therefore would be
"issuer" in
deemed an underwriter as to the securities if the sale were held to
constitute a distribution. Since broker and underwriter statuses are
deemed to be mutually exclusive, the newly characterized underwriter
can no longer rely upon the brokers' transaction exemption under
section 4(4).Y1 Deprived of his exemption, the broker, who executes the
sale in violation of section 5, is faced with liability under the Act and
with loss of his broker's license.18 Weighed against a sales commission,
55. See generally Flanagin, The FederalSecurities Act and the Locked-In Stockholder, 63
MICH. L. REV. 1139, 1142-50 (1965); Sommer, supra note I, at 562-83.

56.
57.

See note 14 supra.
See note 37 supra.

58. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1)(2) (1970).
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these sanctions ensure the broker's cautious reticence when requested to
make a sale for a controlling person.
The place of the controlling person in this scheme is less clear.
Although the loss of the broker's exemption is an effective bar to unregistered distributions by controlling persons, it is a contested question
whether section 4(l)'s exemption of transactions not involving an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer is available to the controlling person. The controlling person is not an issuer under section 4(1) because his status as
an issuer is conferred only for the purposes of section 2(11). If he bought
his controlling securities on the public market, he cannot be said to be
selling them for the issuer within the second part of the section 2(11)
underwriter definition. This statutory ambiguity has led at least one
authority to suggest that the controlling person's liability exists only by
virtue of his aiding and abetting the broker.59 The vast majority of
commentators, however, subscribe to the theory that, although the controlling person is not himself an underwriter under section 2(11), the
'involvement" of an underwriter (i.e. his broker) is sufficient to deprive
the controlling person of his 4(1) exemption.6" Yet a third theory, of
tortured logic, holds that the controlling person is himself an underwriter because of "participation" with his broker in the distribution of the
securities. At varying points in the development of this theory, the
controlling person is a controlling person, an issuer, and an underwriter,
and all within the language of section 2(11). st The common element of
all these theories is their reliance on the presence of a statutory underwriter who helps in the sale of the controlling person's securities. It is
therefore apparent that a controlling person's broker, whose assistance
is a practical necessity, is the key party. If the broker can escape underwriter status, he will be exempted under section 4(4) and the controlling
person will be exempt under section 4(1).
3.

Dispositions of Securities by Controlling Persons.-Priorto

the adoption of Rule 144, controlling persons could dispose of securities
in two kinds of transactions: the private placement and the brokers'
transaction.
59. The aiding and abetting statute relied upon is Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)
(1970). 11 H. SOWARDS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT § 4.04(3)
(1965); Sowards, Private Placements and Secondary Transactions: The Wheat Report Proposals
for Reform, 1970 DUKE L.J. 515, 524.
60. 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 705 n.178; Flanagin, supra note 55, at 1142-50. Comment,
supra note 22, at 485-86 n.65.
61. Comment, supra note 22, at 484 n.53. The authors have noted the inappropriateness of
this theory since the "participating" language of section 2(11) was intended to apply to middlemen
down the chain of distribution and not to the initiating party. Id.
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(a) Private placement of publicly acquired securities.-The sec62
tion 4(2) nonpublic offering exemption is available to the issuer alone.
A private offering exemption, nevertheless, is available to the controlling person who wishes to dispose of publicly acquired securities through
a broker. The exemption relied upon by the controlling person is section
4(I). If the sale is limited to a small number of sophisticated investors,
it is not treated as a "distribution;" the broker selling the securities will
not be an underwriter under section 2(11); and therefore the controlling
person will not lose his section 4(1) exemption, since no underwriter is
"involved" in his sale of securities. This "private placement" exemption
for controlling persons generally has been viewed as coextensive in its
requirements with the issuer's section 4(2) nonpublic offering exemption, although each springs from a distinct statutory origin.63 This reasoning assumes that "distribution" is synonymous with "public offering."" If the controlling person has tailored his resale to conform with
the requirements imposed upon the issuer in a private offering, then no
distribution is deemed to have occurred; therefore, the resale is exempt
under section 4(1).
(b) Disposition of securities in Rule 154 brokers' transactions.-Section 4(4) of the 1933 Securities Act and interpretive Rule
154,65 now superseded by Rule 144,66 provided guidelines for the broker
and controlling person in selling control securities without registration.
By defining "brokers' transactions," "distribution," and "solicitation of
such orders," the rule sets forth the quantity and manner in which a sale
was required to be made for the broker to avoid statutory underwriter
status. The restrictions on the method of sale were intended to ensure
that the disposition would resemble normal trading activity and not the
distribution of securities to the public. 7 The requirements included:
(1) The broker had to perform no more than the "usual and customary broker's function."
(2) He could do no more than execute the controlling person's
order to sell and receive no more than the "usual or customary
broker's commission."
(3) Neither the broker, "nor to his knowledge his principal," could
solicit orders to buy the controlling securities.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
Comment, supra note 22, at 487.
WHEAT REPORT, supra note 4, at 161-62.
17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1971).
Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
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In addition, the broker who adhered to these requirements would still
not qualify for the section 4(4) exemption if he was aware "of circumstances indicating that his principal was6' 8an underwriter. . . or that the
transaction was part of a distribution.
The rule's definition of distribution was limited in scope to broker
sales of control securities. In contrast to Rule 144, it did not, for example, define the term for private offering purposes. Under Rule 154 a
broker selling securities for a controlling person was deemed not to be
engaged in a distribution if the number of securities of the same class
sold by the controlling person within the preceding six-month period,
did not exceed specified percentage limitations. If the security was
traded over-the-counter, the limitation was "approximately" one percent of the total outstanding securities. If the securities were traded on
an exchange, the limitation was "approximately" one percent of the
lesser of either the total outstanding securities or the largest aggregate
reported volume of trading on securities exchanges during any one of
the past four weeks.69
III.

OPERATION OF RULE 14470

A.

Overview

Rule 144 became effective April 15, 1972; its evolution has been
68. SEC Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. 230.154 (1971). Thus, Rule 154 was not available to controlling
private placees, if their resale was made before their securities had come to rest in their hands. If,
however, the broker did make such a sale, he would be excused from sharing his customer's
underwriter status if he could show he was not aware of his customer's distribution. Similarly, if
his control customer was making a distribution of publicly acquired securities by using a number
of different brokers, each of whom had no reason to be aware of the distribution, the brokers would
be able to retain their § 4(4) exemption even though they were in fact participating in the distribution. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969).
When the controlling person is distributing publicly acquired securities through a number of
brokers who are unaware of the distribution, this "good faith exemption" poses an immense
conceptual barrier to holding the controlling person in violation of the § 5 registration requirement,
since a broker must be an underwriter in order to deprive the controlling person of his § 4(1)
exemption. See text following notes 57 & 58. For an excellent treatment of this problem and the
inconsistencies it creates see Comment, supra note 22, at 495-500. The authors suggest that by
permitting the "good faith" broker continued exemption under § 4(4) when he is unknowingly
participating in a distribution by the controlling person, the Commission has exceeded its rulemaking authority. The most persuasive argument on this point is that since § 2(11) contains no
support for the distinction once a distribution exists, and since § 12(1) of the Act imposes strict
liability on persons selling in violation of § 5 either knowingly or otherwise, the Commission has
no power to do indirectly through Rule 154's definition of brokers' transactions that which the
Act expressly prevents. Id. at 511-12.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154(b) (1970), rescinded, Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11,
1972).
70. In preparation for this Note, the author attended a 2-day securities law program hosted
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the subject of several excellent commentaries and will not be reviewed
here.71 Together with eight related rules and amendments that help

facilitate its operation, 2 Rule 144 has marked a major step towards
removing much prior confusion and bringing the administration of the
Act more in line with its policy objectives.
1. Purpose of the Rule.-The purpose of the rule is to provide for

"full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in trading
transactions and to create greater certainty and predictability in the
application of the registration provisions of the Act by replacing subjective standards with more objective ones. 7' 3 The rule's operation is
designed to inhibit "the creation of public markets in securities of is-

suers concerning which adequate current information is not available."
Through the rule, the Commission has sought to bring about greater

coordination and integration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and to imple75
ment a continuous disclosure system.
Rule 144 defines those transactions in which the securities of a

private placee (whether or not a controlling person) and the publicly
acquired securities of a controlling person may be publicly sold without
constituting a distribution and without the private placee or a broker
by Northwestern University School of Law on March 27 and 28, 1972. During the second day, 8
participants addressed the various component features of Rule 144. The 8 were Alan Appelbaum,
Neil Flanagin, Warren F. Grienenberger, Alan B. Levenson, Burton R. Rissman, Donald E.
Schwartz, A. A. Sommer, and Herbert S. Wander. Much of the following analysis is derived from
the lectures delivered by these men and will be noted by reference to their individual addresses.
71. The first formally proposed rules relating to dispositions by controlling persons and
private placees were the "160 Series" recommended by the Wheat Report and proposed by the
Commission in 1969. Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969). Subsequently, the Commission withdrew these proposals and substituted the first proposed Rule 144. Securities Act Release
No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970). The first proposed Rule 144 met wide opposition from the bar. Among
its more objectionable features were a holding period for controlling persons and presumptions
under which those who complied with the rule were merely presumed not to be engaged in a
distribution. In response, the Commission issued a Revised Proposed Rule 144. Securities Act
Release No. 5186 (Sept. 10, 1971). The revised proposal represented a substantial improvement
over the earlier proposal, and with further refinement became the presently adopted Rule 144. See
Chalmers, Grist from Wheat: The New SEC Ground Rules for Venture Capital, 25 Bus. LAW.
1001 (1970); Holland, Public Sale of Control Stock and Private Investment Stock" The SEC's
Proposed New Rules, 25 Bus. LAW. 1027 (1970); Morrow, supra note 38; Sowards, supra note
59.
72. The 7 related rules, amendments and releases are: Exchange Act Releases Nos. 9442 &
9443 (Jan. 10, 1972) (Amendments to Form 10-K and 10-Q under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934); Exchange Act Release No. 9310 (Sept. 13, 1971) (Rule 15c2-1 1); Securities Act Release
No. 5226 (Jan. 10, 1972) (applicability of antifraud provisions); Securities Act Release No. 5225
(Jan. 10, 1972) (Amendment of Regulation A under § 3(b)); and, Securities Act Release No. 5224
(Jan. 10, 1972).
73. SEC Rule 144, Securities Release No. 5223 at 5 (Jan. 11, 1972).
74. Id. at 17.
75. See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
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of the controlling person therefore becoming a statutory underwriter
under section 2(11).16 In contrast to rescinded Rule 154, the fulcrum of
Rule 144 is not the definition of brokers' transactions under section 4(4),
but the definition of distributionunder section 2(11). Conceptually, this
shift in emphasis facilitates the inclusion of sales by private placees and
controlling persons within the purview of a single rule.
In one of the rule's more dramatic departures from past law, the
Commission has made the existence or nonexistence of a distribution,
or a broker for a
when securities are sold by either a private placee
7
factors:
three
of
function
a
person,
controlling
(1) whether there exists "adequate current information concerning
the issuer

...

;"

(2) whether the seller has owned his securities for a sufficient
amount of time to demonstrate that he has assumed the risk of his
investment and is therefore not "acting as a conduit for the public
sale of unregistered securities" by the issuer; and
(3) whether the sale is made in a manner and quantity that does
not disrupt the trading market.
Prior to the adoption of the rule, the private placee had only to satisfy
the second factor and the controlling person to satisfy the third. 78 Now,
the private placee must not only hold his securities for a sufficient
holding period (two years under the rule), but must also ensure that
there is adequate current information concerning the issuer and that his
sale is made within the quantity limitations of a one percent "leakage"
or "dribble" rule and in the manner of a broker's transaction. A broker
selling publicly acquired securities for a controlling person must not
only continue to conform to quantity and manner restrictions, but must
also ensure the availability of adequate current information concerning
the issuer. The controlling person is relieved, however, of any holding
period requirement for his publicly acquired securities since the public
purchase demonstrates that he is not serving as a "conduit for the public
sale of unregistered securities" by the issuer.
2. Definition of Terms.-The rule begins by defining "affiliate,"
"person," and "restricted securities." An affiliate is a controlling per76. The rule has been adopted pursuant to § 19(a): "The Commission shall have authority
• . . to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter, including rules . . . defining accounting, technical, and trade terms
used in this subchapter." Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970).
77. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, SEC Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan.
11, 1972).
78. See text accompanying notes 30-69 supra.
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son. Restricted securities are securities acquired from an issuer or an
affililate "in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any
public offering." 79 Thus a private placee (whether or not a controlling
person) holds restricted securities. An affiliate who has acquired his
control securities on the open market holds nonrestricted securities. His
status as a controlling person, not the source of his securities, is the
reason his sales are limited.
"Person" is defined to include the person who sells securities under
the rule, his spouse, relatives, spouse's relatives living with the person,
and any estate, trust, or business of which ten percent is beneficially
owned individually or collectively by any of the aforementioned "persons"." In addition, the rule requires inclusion of those who "agree to
act in concert for the purpose of selling securities" when determining
the amount of securities that such person can sell under the rule.' 1
3. Conditions of the Rule.-Section (b) of the rule provides that
an affiliate or nonaffiliate who sells restricted securities or a broker who

sells restricted or nonrestricted securities for an affiliate "shall be
deemed not to be engaged in a distribution" if all conditions of the rule
are met.82 Thus the rule is available only to persons, controlling or

noncontrolling, who sell securities acquired from the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer in a nonpublic offering and to controlling persons
79. SEC Rule 144(a)(3), 37 Fed. Reg. 591(1972).
80. SEC Rule 144(a)(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 591(1972). "The term 'person' when used with reference to a person for whose account securities are to be sold in reliance upon this section includes,
Any relative or spouse of such person,
in addition to such person, all of the following persons: (i)
or any relative of such spouse, any one of whom has the same home as such person; (ii) Any trust
or estate in which such person or any of the persons specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph
collectively own 10 percent or more of the total beneficial interest or of which any of such persons
serve as trustee, executor or in any similar capacity; and (iii) Any corporation or other organization (other than the issuer) in which such person or any of the persons specified in (i)are the
beneficial owners collectively of 10 percent or more of any class of equity securities or 10 percent
or more of the equity interest." This section is essentially the same as that contained in the revised
proposed Rule 144. It has, however, substituted a precise 10% test for trust and estates in lieu of
the far more ambiguous "substantial beneficial interest" test used in the revised proposal. Revised
Proposal Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5186 (Sept. 10, 1971).
One ambiguity is created, however, by a format change. The revised rule has set out family
attribution rules in 2 sections: "(A) The spouse and minor children of such person; (B) Any relative
of such person or of his spouse who has the same home as such person." Id. The present rule,
however, can be read to mean that the spouse and relative of the seller are included only if they
have the same home. The SEC staff has apparently adopted this more realistic interpretation.
CCH FED. SEC. LAW REP. No. 421 at 5 (Apr. 26, 1972).
81. SEC Rule 144(e)(3)(vi), 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (1972). SEC staff members have indicated that
concurrent sales by corporate directors, standing alone, would not constitute concerted action,
although an inquiry might be prompted. Wander, Rule 144 Adopted, 5 REV. SEC. REG. 958, n.3
(1972).
82. SEC Rule 144(b), 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (1972).
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selling nonrestricted securities. The rule is not available, for example,
to an issuer or to a dealer who is a member of a selling group in a
registered public offering and who would like to sell an unsold portion
of the allotment.8

The remainder of the rule sets forth the five conditions that must
be met. If satisfied, the conditions assure the nonexistence of a distribu-

tion. Their headings are: "current public information," "holding period
for restricted securities," "limitations on amount of securities sold,"
"manner of sale," and "notice of proposed sale."
B.

Current Public Information

The rule's first condition, that there exist "available adequate current information," is predicated upon the belief that unregistered public

sales by controlling persons and private placees should be permitted
only if the issuer of the securities sold is making current public disclosures concerning its finances and business.' To this end, the rule relies
heavily on the improved reporting requirements of the 1934 Act; al-

though the condition may be satisfied by nonreporting companies, the
rule evidences a clear preference for use of the machinery of the 1934
Act to satisfy its disclosure requirement.
1. Reporting Companies.-With a few exceptions, issuers listed

on a national exchange (section 12(a) companies),8 issuers with 500 or
more equity security holders and a total asset value in excess of
1,000,000 dollars (section 12(g) companies), 8 and issuers who have reg-

istered securities under the 1933 Act (section 15(d) companies), 7 are
required to file reports pursuant to sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934
Act and are therefore "reporting companies." 8 In addition, any issuer
83. In these cases, the dealer would not have acquired his securities from the issuer in a
transactionnot involving any public offering. Address by Alan B. Levenson, Securities Law Program, Northwestern University School of Law, Mar. 28, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Northwestern].
84. Cf Cohen, supra note 75; ABA FederalRegulation ofSecurities Conference on Codification, 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967).
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
86. Id. § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
87. Id. § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970). The § 15(d) reporting requirement is automatically suspended after the first year of registration if the number of securities holders of the same
class as were sold in the registered offering reaches fewer than 300. Id.
88. Section 15(d) companies are required to file periodic reports under § 15(d); § 12(b) and
(g) companies are required to file periodic reports under § 13. In addition, § 12(b) and (g) companies are required to conform with federal proxy rules under § 14 of the 1934 Act and their officers,
directors and 10% shareholders are subject to § 16 of the 1934 Act, which requires reporting of
their transactions in the issuer's securities and prohibits short-swing profits thereon. Id. § 15(d),
15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970); Id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970). Id. § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970);
Id. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). Although the § 15(d) companies are "reporting companies"
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may voluntarily become a reporting company under section 12(g) of the
1934 Act by filing the reports required under section 13.89
Rule 144(c)(1) provides that the information requirement is satisfied if the issuer has been filing current reports under either section 13
or 15(d) of the Exchange Act for at least 90 days prior to the sale and
has filed its most recent annual report.90 The 90-day requirement is
double edged. First it ensures the currency of the information, and
secondly, it requires that the issuer have been a reporting company for
the 90-day period. In effect, the latter aspect imposes a three-month
waiting period on sales of the securities of a company that has just begun
to report under the Exchange Act. 9
It is, of course, the seller or broker of the seller, not the issuer, who
is concerned most with the satisfaction of the rule's information requirement as well as its other requirements. What assurance does the broker
or seller have that a reporting issuer whose securities he is attempting
to sell under the rule has complied fully with the 144(c)(1) requirement?
In contemplation of this problem, forms 10-K and I0-Q, the annual and
quarterly reports required of most reporting companies under sections
13 and 15(d), have been amended to require the issuer's statement of
whether all reports required to be filed "within the past 90 days" have
been filed.92 The rule entitles the seller to rely upon the issuer's statement of compliance that appears either in the most recent annual or
quarterly report or in a written statement from the issuer, unless the
seller "knows or has reason to believe" that the issuer has not complied
with the information requirements. 3
The scope and application of the reliance provision are not altogether clear. The breadth of the "has reason to believe that the issuer
has not complied" clause, for example, is uncertain. Clearly, controlling
persons in the executive hierarchy of the issuer could not rely upon the
issuer's written statement that it has complied when in fact it has not,
but precisely what degree of intimacy with corporate affairs is necessary
(§ 12(b), (g) and 15(d) companies) are essentially the same, consisting of an annual report (Form
10-K, filed within 90 days of fiscal year end), a quarterly report (Form 10-Q, filed within 45 days
of the first 3 fiscal quarters), and current reports of significant corporate events (Form 8-K, filed
within 10 days of the end of any month in which the event occurred). 17 CFR §§240.13a-1 to -13,
240.15d-1 to -13 (1971).
89. Securities Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
90. The Chief Counsel of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance has been cited as saying
that an issuer who has been reporting for 90 days but has not been required to file an annual report
will be deemed to have satisfied the information requirement. Wander, supra note 82, at 958 n.5.
91. Address by Burton R. Rissman, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
92. Securities Exchange Release No. 9442 (Jan. 10, 1972).
93. SEC Rule 144(c)(1).
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to impute to the seller the "reason to believe"? Similarly, it is uncertain

whether a broker is entitled to rely on the issuer's statement. The rule
refers only to the "person for whose account the securities are to be
sold," but at least one authority has taken the position that the broker
could also rely on such statements."4 In addition, there are a number of
problems related to the timing of the issuer's statement. How contemporary, for example, must the issuer's "written statement" be? Since the
seller is entitled to rely on the issuer's warranty of compliance as it
appears in the most recent annual or quarterly report, is it sufficient that
a "written statement" has been given at some time between the filing
of the most recent report and the time of sale?" These problems hopefully will be sorted out during the normal administration of the rule.
2.

Nonreporting Companies.-Personswho would like to sell the

securities of a nonreporting company under Rule 144 are given little
assistance. Subsection (c)(2) provides that, with the exception of insurance companies, nonreporting companies must make available the information contained in new Rule 15c2-1 I(a)(4).11 The seller, however,
is given no hint about what will constitute the public availability of such
information. Alan Levenson has stated that it will not be sufficient
merely to deliver the information contained in Rule 15c2-11 to the
broker and that the determination whether the information is publicly
available will be made on a case-by-case basis until there has been
enough experience with the requirement to establish some guidelines.
The difficulty of accumulating the information called for in Rule
15c2-1 I(a)(4) and the absence of any guidelines relating to public availability of the information seriously impair access to Rule 144 by affiliates
and restricted security holders of nonreporting companies. Although the
holder might be willing to risk noncompliance, it is far less likely that
any broker would do so absent clear guidelines. A possible solution
94. Address by Burton R. Rissman, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
95. Id. Another problem is created by the time requirements of Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8K, supra note 88. Assume Form 10-K is filed on March 30 for the first fiscal quarter with an
issuer's statement of compliance. The seller, in reliance, sells on April 15. There is no way for the
seller to know whether Form 8-K (current report filed within 10 days after the month in which a
significant corporate event occurred) should have been filed if in fact one was not filed. Address
by Burtrn R. Rissman, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
96. Securities Exchange Release No. 9310 (Sept. 13, 1971). Rule 15c2-11 attempts to prevent
creation of public markets in "shell corporations" without adequate disclosures. Information
concerning the issuer is required to be made available to the broker and public in certain instances
before the securities of the issuer can be submitted to quotation media. Rule 144 uses the majority
of the itemized information listed in Rule 15c2-11 and applies it to nonreporting issuers seeking
to fulfill its information requirement.
97. Address by Alan B. Levenson, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
98. Addresses by Alan Appelbaum & Burton R. Rissman, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
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would be for security holders to press for the issuer's voluntary registration under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and thereby make the
more specific guidelines of 144(c)(1) available." Although encouraged
by the Commission, 1' the voluntary registration option may be of marginal utility to the seller and issuer. Not only does registration under
the 1934 Act impose reporting obligations and potential liabilities on the
issuer and seller, but the seller may also find that since the issuer is a
small company with limited shareholders, the small market in his securities will make it virtually impossible to comply with the rule's further
requirement that the sale be executed in unsolicited brokers' transactions.
C. Holding Period
The second condition of the rule is that the person for whose account restricted securities are sold must have been the beneficial owner
of the securities for at least two years.' 0' The two-year holding period is
intended to ensure that the holder of restricted securities has assumed
the unconditional economic risk of his investment and therefore has not
acquired the securities as a conduit for the issuer's sale of unregistered
securities. Although the length of the holding period may be questioned, 02 its presence has clarified one of the major sources of prior
confusion by expressly answering the question "how long must I hold?"
In addition, the Commission has eliminated the change of circumstances doctrine for sales occurring under Rule 144, recognizing that "the
circumstances of the seller are unrelated to the need of investors for the
afforded by the registration and other provisions of the
protections
03
Act."
1. Restricted Securities Acquired by Purchase.-Consistentwith
its belief that the private placee must assume the economic risk of his
investment, the rule provides that, if the securities have been purchased,
the two-year period will begin to run only when "the full purchase price
or other consideration shall have been paid or given ... ."01 Subsec99. Aside from the disparity of bargaining power between issuer and noncontrolling private
placees. there are a number of hurdles which impede effective registration covenants. In the absence
of the issuer's full cooperation, for example, it is unclear whether the investor could obtain specific
performance. If he could not, it is uncertain how his damages would be measured. Address by
Burton R. Rissman, Northwestern Mar. 27, 1972.
100. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 14-15 (Jan. 11, 1972).
101. SEC Rule 144(d)(1).
102. See Wander, supra note 82, at 958.
103. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 3 (Jan. 11, 1972).
104. SEC Rule 144(d)(1).
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tion (d)(2) imposes a limitation on purchases of restricted securities with
promissory notes, installment contracts or other obligations of future
payment. These methods of payment are deemed not to be full payment
of the purchase price and therefore the running of the holding period
does not begin unless each of the following conditions are met. First,
the note, contract, or obligation must provide for "full recourse against
the purchaser of the securities." Secondly, the note must be "secured
by collateral, other than the securities purchased, having a fair market
value at least equal to the purchase price of the securities purchased."
Finally, the note must have been discharged by payment in full prior to
the resale of the securities.1 5 Although the second condition leaves the
time for determining the adequacy of the collateral open, the staff has
taken the position that if a decline in its fair market value will cause
adequate collateral to become inadequate, the holding period will be
tolled until the adequacy of the collateral has been restored." 8
2. Application of the Fungibility Doctrine.-Forsales occurring
under the rule, the Commission has eliminated the doctrine of fungibility. 10 7 Acquisition by a restricted security holder during the holding
period of additional securities of the same issuer, whether restricted or
nonrestricted, will therefore not start the holding period running anew.
The only vestige of the doctrine is a provision that calls for the tolling
of the holding period during a time when an owner of restricted securities has a short position or holds any put or option to dispose of securities of the same class or securities convertible into the same class. 08 If
the rationale of the tolling provision is to deny private placees the opportunity of using short sales or puts to avoid the requirement of assuming
the economic risk of their investment, then the Commission is guilty of
overkill. To illustrate, assume A is the beneficial owner of 1,000 shares
of restricted X stock for which he has paid the full purchase price.
Although a subsequent put for 50 shares of the same class of X
minimizes the economic risk of one twentieth of A's investment, the
hybrid fungibility element of the rule operates to toll the holding period
of A's entire 1,000 shares. Even if A purchased an additional 50 shares
in the open market to cover his put and thereby preserved the entire
economic risk of his restricted stock holding, the provision nevertheless
would toll the two-year period for the entire 1,000 shares. In addition,
105.
106.
as the debt
supra note
107.
108.

SEC Rule 144(d)(2).
Address by Neil Flanagin, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972. It also should be noted that
decreases, the staff has conceded that the collateral may decrease accordingly. Wander,
82, at 959 n.8.
Securities Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). See note 169 infra.
SEC Rule 144(d)(3).
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A must be cautioned that any put, short or option to sell stock of the
same class made by another person within the "attribution circle"'' 9 of
"person" as defined in section 144(a)(2) will cause the holding period
of his 1,000 shares to be tolled.
3. Guidelines for Tacking.-By providing specific "tacking"
guidelines, Rule 144 has clarified another source of prior confusion in
the area of private placements. The rule addresses two kinds of situations in which tacking causes the holding period of restricted securities
to relate back to the time of some prior acquisition. The first situation
relates to tacking the holding period of restricted securities to that of
previously acquired securities in the hands of a single holder, and the
second relates to tacking the holding periods of restricted securities
between two or more holders.
Subsections (d)(4)(A)-(C) provide that for purposes of determining
their holding periods, securities acquired in stock dividends, stock splits
or reverse splits, recapitalizations, conversions, or as contingent payments in business combinations are deemed to have been acquired at the
time the underlying securities were acquired. To gain the benefit of this
tacking provision, certain qualifications must be met. Under the rule,
in a conversion the holding period of the surrendered security can be
tacked to that of the underlying security; the provision requires, however, that. the underlying securities be received "solely" in exchange for
the surrendered securities. It is not clear whether this limitation on the
permissible consideration prohibits the payment of cash for fractional
shares or the satisfaction of unpaid interest on the underlying security." 0
Similarly, restrictions surround the use of tacking when contingent
shares are issued pursuant to a corporate fusion agreement. The tacking
of contingent issuances is limited to contingent security payments for
an equity interest in or for assets of a business sold to the issuer or
affiliate of the issuer."' Moreover, the conditions of the contingency
must not require payment to the issuer by the recipient of the contingent
security of any further consideration, with the exception of agreements
for continued employment or noncompetition. If these conditions are
met, then the holding period of issued contingent securities will relate
back to the time at which the equity interest or assets were sold to the
issuer or its affiliate. The contingent tacking provision is most helpful
in acquisitions of businesses whose uncertain value requires the total
109.

"Attribution circle" is here used to refer to persons included in the rule's definition of

110.
11l.

Cf. Address by Neil Flanagin, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
SEC Rule 144(d)(4)(C).

"person."
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consideration to be conditioned on the future earnings of the acquired
business or on the future market value of the issuer's securities. Although they are not expressly mentioned, the provision seems broad
enough to include statutory mergers and consolidations as well as asset
and securities acquisitions. The provision also seems broad enough to
permit the use of a different class or form of security in the contingent
issuance." 2 Although the requirements surrounding contingent issuances
appear soundly drawn, the rule's treatment of stock dividends, stock
splits, reverse splits, and recapitalizations seems somewhat anomalous,
since in these cases the securities generally are acquired in public transactions rather than the private transactions necessary to make them
"restricted" securities subject to the holding period.'
Subsections (d)(4)(D)-(G) address tacking of holding periods
among two or more security holders." 4 Underpinning these provisions
is the proposition that a subsequent holder of restricted securities "steps
into the shoes" of the person from whom the restricted securities were
acquired. The subsections provide that in certain instances restricted
securities sold by a pledgee, acquired by gift, or through a trust are
deemed to have been acquired at the time they were acquired by the
pledgor, donor, or settlor." 5 For a pledgee to tack the period of retention
of the pledgor to his own holding period, the pledgee's sale of the
securities must follow a default in the obligation secured by the
pledge." 6 In addition, the securities must have been bona fide pledged,
with recourse, and by a person other than the issuer."' Tacking by
donees of restricted securities is limited only by the requirement that the
donor not be the issuer." 8 A trust is permitted to tack the settlor's
holding period and beneficiaries of the trust are permitted double tacking of the settlor and trust's holding periods. This double tacking opportunity also is available to the purchaser of restricted securities from a
112.

Presumably the same would be true for dividend payments and recapitalizations. It is

by definition the case in conversions.
113. Wander, supra note 82, at 959 n.10.

114.

For tacking by estates and their beneficiaries see notes 148-53 infra and accompanying

115.

Note, however, the way in which the sales are aggregated. See notes 148-53 infra and

text.
accompanying text.
116. SEC Rule 144(d)(4)(D).
117. Id. When restricted securities are pledged without recourse, the pledgee's holding period
runs from the time of the pledge. Id. It is uncertain when the holding period would begin to run if
the pledge were not bona fide or the pledgor were the issuer. Presumably the holding period would
not begin to run until the pledgee could demonstrate that the equivalent of full consideration had
been given.
118. The need for this condition may be questioned since the issuer would have no
recognizable holding period to tack.
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pledgee who has tacked the holding period of the pledgor."9
Although not expressly mentioned, subsection (d)(4), because of
the "attribution circle" of 144(a)(2)'s definition of "person . . . for

whose account securities are sold" could create effective tacking-including multiple tacking-for persons who acquire restricted
securities from within their own attribution circle, since such transactions would be among individuals defined to be the same person.," This
attributive tacking arguably would occur whether a pledge, gift, trust,
or estate were involved. Moreover, a pledgee who is also a relative living
in the household of the pledgor would be able to "tack" the holding
period of the pledgor even if, for example, the securities were pledged
without recourse. If tacking within the attribution circle is permitted,
as logically it must be, there is an open question whether the relationship
necessary for attribution must exist during the entire two-year holding
period, or merely at the time of the acquisition, or at the time of sale.
With the exception of attributive tacking, no tacking is permitted
in situations for which there is no express provision. Accordingly, a
private placee of restricted securities is not able to tack the holding
period of others to that of his own and a holder of restricted securities
who has purchased securities that have been held for a year must hold
them for an additional two years.'
The language of the tacking provisions relating to stock dividends,
splits, recapitalizations and conversions makes the application of the
rule somewhat uncertain when any of these transactions occur after the
underlying securities are in the hands of someone other than the original
holder. If, for example, a stock dividend is paid on restricted securities
which have been transferred by the original holder to a trust, when will
securities received in the dividend be deemed to have been acquired by
the trust? Since the trust is able to tack the settlor's holding period for
the underlying security with its own,' a visceral response might be to
relate the securities acquired in the dividend back to the time at which
the settlor acquired the underlying security. This solution, however, is
not clearly supported by the language of the rule, which provides that
"securities acquired from the issuer as a dividend

. . .

shall be deemed

119. Presumably, the occasion for double tacking by a purchaser from a pledgee would only
arise when default occurs within 2 years of the pledgor's original purchase. This would require that
the pledgee's sale have been made by an avenue other than Rule 144. The same double tacking
privilege is given beneficiaries of estates. See note 148 infra and accompanying text.
120. Address by Neil Flanagin, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
121. There is no need, however, for the holder to aggregate his sales with those of the private
placee from whom he received his securities. See SEC Rule 144(e)(3)(A)-(G); Wander, supra note

82, at 959.
122.

SEC Rule 144(d)(4)(F).
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to have been acquired at the same time as the securities on which the
dividend

. . .

was paid." 1 This language also covers stock splits and

recapitalizations and similar language is used for conversion124 The
difficulty is that there have been two acquisitions, one by the settlor, and
one by the trust. To permit the trust to tack vis-h-vis the securities
acquired in the dividend, the first acquisition must be controlling and
the sentence read to mean "acquired at the same time as the securities
on which the dividend

. . .

was paid for by the originalholder." While

this construction may seem emminently fair in the present instance, it
could be unreasonable in another. Assume, for example, that the restricted security, upon which the subsequent dividend was paid, was
transferred to a pledgee in a non-bona fide pledge or to a private placee
in a private placement. When the same construction is given, the pledgee
or private placee, for whom tacking of underlying securities is denied,
could tack for purposes of determining the holding period of the securities received in the dividend. It is submitted that the most reasonable
answer would be to permit the original acquisition to control, but only
if subsequent acquisitions are by persons or entities who are permitted
by the rule to tack the holding periods of the underlying securities. This
would permit, for example, a trust receiving restricted securities to tack
not only the settlor's holding period for the underlying securities to its
own, but also to relate any dividends paid on the securities back to the
time of the settlor's purchase. This would prevent, however, a non-bona
fide pledgee from tacking his dividend holding period, since the rule
wofild not permit his tacking of the underlying securities.
D. Securities Sales Limitation
To sell securities under Rule 144 controlling persons and private
placees holding restricted securities must comply with the percentage
limitation set out in subsection (e)(1)'of the rule. The new inclusion of
private placees within the percentage restrictions may be justified by
much the same reasoning that accompanied the departure of the change
of circumstances doctrine. It has been argued that the length of time
during which a private placee refrains from selling his entire holdings
has little relation to the impact on the market that the sale might have.
A disruptive effect is just as likely to occur if a large block of stock is
sold ten years after the placement as it would be if the stock were sold
within two years after the placement. Rule 144 therefore places empha123.

SEC Rule 144(d)(4)(A) (emphasis added).

124. Id. at (d)(4)(A),(B).
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sis on the distributional character of the subsequent sale, not the intention or "view," of the private placee at the time of his purchase. The
statutory support for imposing an amount limitation on resale by private placees is found in section 2(11). That section makes a person an
underwriter not only if he takes from the issuer with the present intention of making a distribution but also if he takes with an investment
intent and then later participates in a distribution. The Commission
therefore seems to be shifting its emphasis from the "taking with a view
to" language to the "participating in a distribution" phrase of section
2(11).125
1. Percentage Limitation on Sales.-Affiliates

of the issuer and

restricted security holders under Rule 144(e) are limited in the amount
of securities that they can dispose of during a specified period of time
to a one percent leakage or dribble provision. More precisely, if the
securities are admitted to trading on a national securities exchange,
sales in each six-month period are limited to the lesser of:
(1)
the
(2)
ties

one percent of the shares or other units of the class outstanding as shown by
most recent report or statement published by the issuer, or
[one percent of] the average weekly reported volume of trading in such securion all exchanges during the four calendar weeks preceding [the sale] .... "I

If the securities are not traded on a national exchange, the limitation is
one percent of the shares or other units of the class outstanding as shown
by the most recent report or statement published by the issuer without
consideration of the average weekly volume.'2
Although these leakage provisions are much the same as those
applied to controlling persons by prior Rule 154, a number of noteworthy differences exist. First, Rule 154 was somewhat equivocal because
the word "approximately" was placed before the one percent limitation.
Dropping the term "approximately" leaves little room for marginally
2
inaccurate calculation. 1
Secondly, in providing for the determination of the amount of
outstanding securities, Rule 144 refers to "the most recent report or
125. See notes 76 & 77 supra and accompanying text.
126. SEC Rule 144(e)(l)(A). If a Form 144 notice is required to be filed (See notes 146 &
147 infra and accompanying text), the 4 calendar weeks are counted back from the date of filing.
If Form 144 is not required, they are counted from the broker's receipt of the order to execute the
transaction.
127. SEC Rule 144(e)(1)(B). The Commission has noted, however, that when the automated
quotation of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASDAQ) makes reliable
volume figures publicly available, it will consider amending the rule to make the volume control
the percentage amount for over-the-counter securities. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 10 (Jan.
I1,1972).
128. Address by Herbert S. Wander, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
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statement published by the issuer." Under prior law, the number of
outstanding securities was calculated at the time of sale, enabling a
controlling person to take advantage of the most recent issues or distributions of the issuer. This opportunity is now limited. In addition, there
is some question about what constitutes "a statement published by the
issuer." Has the issuer, for example, "published" a statement of the
number of outstanding securities when it has filed a statement with the
SEC including these figures? 2 1 If so, presumably it makes no difference
in which of the many forms required to be filed the information appears.
Thirdly, in its provisions for determining the volume of securities
traded on all exchanges, Rule 144 requires use of the average weekly
volume instead of the largest weekly volume over the previous four
weeks. This change was made to mitigate possible distortion of the
regular trading volume caused by irregular block trading. 3 ' Another
question that arises in the calculation of the percentage limitation of the
rule is whether additional securities within the one percent limit can be
sold if the volume of trading in the securities increases after the sale of
what would otherwise have been the maximum one percent amount.
Under Rule 154 it was possible for a controlling person to take advantage of a higher subsequent weekly volume within six months in determining the maximum amount of gecurities that could be sold within the
one percent limitation.13' Although the same possibility seems to exist
under the language of Rule 144, the SEC staff recently has indicated
that only one computation of the average weekly trading volume within
a six-month period can be used, 32 and the time of that computation
must be the date at which the first notice of sale 33 is filed with the
Commission. The staff did indicate, however, that a moving average is
being considered, which would take account of both upward and downward movement in trading volume. 134 The moving average seems to be
a more reasonable approach since the purpose of the percentage limitation is only to contain the amount of securities sold in relation to the
overall trading in the security. Unlike the practice under Rule 154, a
security holder under Rule 144 may sell securities within the appropriate
129. Id.
130. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 10 (Jan. 11, 1972).
131. 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 2668 (Supp. 1969). If, for example, the quota on a weekly
average at the time the order to sell was 25,000 shares, a controlling person sold that amount, and
several months later there was a week in which the trading volume set the quota at 40,000 shares,
then the controlling person could have sold an additional 15,000 during the 6-month period.
132. BNA SECURITIEs REG. & LAW REP. No. 149, C-i (Apr. 26, 1972).
133. Id. The moving average, however, would be designed to prevent "bootstrapping," i.e.,
taking advantage of increased volume caused by the seller's own prior sales.
134. Id.
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3
No accumulation is
limitation in successive six-month periods.'1
permitted, however; therefore, a person cannot skip six months and then
sell an accumulated amount in the following six months.

2.

Determination of Amount.-After computing the number of

securities that can be sold within the appropriate one percent limitation,
the seller then must determine which securities sold within the past six
months (including those presently being sold) must be aggregated to
determine whether the seller is remaining within the one percent
limitation. For this purpose, affiliates and nonaffiliates are treated differently. In determining the amount he can presently sell under the rule,
the affiliate, or controlling person, unless expressly excepted, must include all restricted and nonrestricted securities of the same class that
have been sold for his account within the previous six months. For the
nonaffiliate, only sales of restricted securities of the same class that have
been sold for his account during the past six months are included. The
nonaffiliate is free to sell any of his nonrestricted securities without
regard to the rule; he remains a public investor whose sales section 4(1)
was intended to exempt. For both the affiliate and the nonaffiliate,
securities sold pursuant to a registration statement, under Regulation
A, or under section 4(2) of the Act, are expressly excluded from the
amount subject to the leakage provision.
At this point, the affiliate or nonaffiliate holder of restricted securities knows the quantity of his own sales that must be included in the
present amount limitation. With this quantity, however, the rule requires the aggregation of sales by certain other persons within the same
six-month period. The intention is largely to prevent a seller's use of
nonsale transfers as the first step in an ultimate sale of securities in
excess of the one percent amount limitation. Thus, pledgors and pledgees, donors and donees, settlors and trusts, and persons who agree to
act in concert for the purpose of selling securities are required to aggregate their sales over the six-month period when computing the amount
which each can sell. 38 The rule requires aggregation within six-month
periods only for two years after the transfer of the securities to the donee
or trust or the default of the obligation pledged by the securities. In
addition to these aggregation rules, each seller should be reminded of
the automatic aggregation among members of the "attribution circle"
drawn by the definition of "person."
135. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 11 (Jan. 11, 1972). Under Rule 154 successive sales
were not permitted. Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 20, 1966).
136. SEC Rule 144(e)(3)(B)-(F). For treatment of estates see notes 148-153 infra and
accompanying text.
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Manner of Sale

The manner of sale provision found in Rule 144(f) may be a wolf
in sheep's clothing for the seller who cursorily reviews its requirement.
To comply with Rule 144 both affiliates and private placees are required
to sell their securities through brokers' transactions within the meaning
of section 4(4) of the 1933 Act. If the seller wishes to employ a negotiated transaction to dispose of his securities, he must look elsewhere for
an assurance that his sales will not constitute a distribution under section 2(1 1).137 In addition to the requirement that the securities be sold
in a broker's transaction, the seller under subsection (f) must not solicit
or arrange for the solicitation of orders to buy the securities or make
any payment in connection with the sale to any person other than the
issuer. An element of the no-solicitation requirement which was not a
feature of prior proposals is the Commission's insistence that brokers
not publish their own quotations of the security in an inter-dealer quotation service.138 If quotations are being made at the time a customer
wishes to make a sale under the rule, the broker apparently will have
to withdraw the quotation before executing the sale.
To comply with the definition of "brokers' transactions" in subsection (g) of the rule, the broker of the affiliate or private placee must do
no more than execute the order to sell as an agent for the seller and may
receive no more than the "usual and customary broker's commission."
Like the seller, the broker cannot solicit or arrange for the solicitation
of customers' orders to buy the seller's securities." 9 In addition, the
broker must make "reasonable inquiry" to ensure that the seller is not
an underwriter and that the sale is not part of a distribution, and, in this
regard, he is deemed to know all of the information contained in the
seller's Form 144 notice.140
The purpose of requiring the controlling persons and private placees to dispose of their securities in brokers' transactions is in large part
an extension of the same purpose found in Rule 154-to ensure that the
sale is not attended by the kind of activity normally associated with a
137. See notes 154-198 infra and accompanying text.
138. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 11 n.6 (Jan. 11, 1972). This addition has been
criticized by at least one commentator as being unnecessarily strict. See Wander, supra note 82,
at 960.
139. The rule permits, however, arrangements or solicitations by the broker himself of other
broker-dealers who have indicated an interest in the securities within the preceding 60 days. SEC
Rule 144(g)(2). The rule apparently would preclude calling back an institutional investor who has
expressed interest in the securities within the last 60 days. Address by Alan Levenson, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
140. SEC Rule 144(g)(3); see notes 146 & 147 infra.
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distribution. In its operation, the requirement presents several problems
for the broker and seller. The normal and customary fee, to which the
broker's commission is limited, for example, may pose increasing definitional difficulty as the frequency of negotiated commissions accelerates. 4' Of far greater concern to the broker, however, are the boundaries
of his duty to make "reasonable inquiry." As long as he can satisfy this
requirement and keep his activities in line with the remaining elements
of the brokers' transactions definition, he will have ensured his exemption under section 4(4) even if the seller is subsequently found to have
142
been engaged in a distribution in violation of section 5 of the Act.
Conducting a reasonable inquiry is particularly difficult because its
subject, the "person . . . for whose account the securities are sold,"
includes all members of any "attribution circle" as well as other persons
with whom the seller may be selling in concert. The broker's task in
assuring the adequacy of his inquiry is somewhat eased, however, by a
number of matters listed by the rule as necessary subjects of inquiry."'
These include the length of time the securities have been held by the
seller; the nature of the transaction in which the securities were acquired
by the seller; the amount sold within the past six months; whether the
seller intends to sell additional securities of the same class through any
other means; whether the seller has done any soliciting or made any
payments to any other persons; and the number of outstanding shares
or the relevant trading volume. In making these inquiries, the broker
will have to go beyond the assurances of his customer, but the extent to
1 44
which he must independently inquire is presently unknown.
Perhaps the most limiting feature of the rule's restriction on the
manner of sale is the no-solicitation requirement. A holder of securities
with a fairly inactive market may find it difficult to sell his securities
without some solicitation. This problem is most often present for holders of over-the-counter securities."' Although hardship to the seller nor141. Announcement by William J. Casey, Chairman, SEC, Mar. 15, 1972, reported in BNA
SEC. REG. LAW REP., at A-6 (Mar. 22, 1972)(setting 1974 as target for permitting negotiated
commissions on block sales of securities exceeding $100,000).
142. A good argument can be made that the exemption of the broker, when a distribution
has in fact occurred, is beyond the Commission's rule-making power. Note 68 supra.
143. SEC Rule 144(g)(3) n.2.
144. A source of information for the broker is Form 144, when it is required to be filed. An
additional source has been provided by new amendments to Forms 10-K and 10-Q. These amendments require the issuer to include information both as to private placements and compliance with
the periodic reporting requirements. Securities Exchange Act Releases Nos. 9442, 9443 (Jan. 10,
1972).
145. If the securities were lightly traded on a national securities exchange, the volume of
tradings criteria of the percentage test may limit severely the holder's ability to dispose of his
securities. SEC Rule 144(e)(l)(A).
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mally can be justified because inactively traded shares are usually attended by the least public disclosure, completely prohibiting solicitation
may impose too great a burden on the institutional investor who has
provided needed venture capital in exchange for restricted debt securities.
F.

Notice of ProposedSale

The final condition to be met under Rule 144 is that the seller
transmit a notice of his proposed sale to the Securities and Exchange
Commission concurrently with the placing of a sell order."' The seller,
however, is relieved of the notice requirement if the number of securities
to be sold during any six-month period is not more than 500 shares and
the aggregate sale price does not exceed 10,000 dollars. If the notice is
filed and the proposed sale is not consummated within 90 days thereafter, then an amended notice must be transmitted concurrently with
any future sale. Finally, the seller is required to have a bona fide intention to sell his securities within a reasonable time after filing his notice;
presumably, an intention to sell within 90 days will meet this requirement.
Form 144 sets forth the kind of information that must be disclosed
when the notice of proposed sale is filed. The form calls for information
relating to the issuer, the person making the sale, the security being sold,
the date of anticipated sale, the name of the broker completing the sale,
and the exchanges upon which the securities are traded. The form also
requires the information necessary to determine the seller's holding
period and the amount of sales within the previous six months by the
seller and other persons subject to the aggregation rules. Finally, above
the seller's signature is a statement that "the person for whose account
the securities . . . are to be sold . . . does not know any material

adverse information in regard to the current or prospective operations
of the issuer .

. . ."

Here again, the seller would include members of

his immediate attribution circle. The extent to which this statement
extends the seller's possible liability, particularly under section 10(b)-5
of the 1934 Act, is not altogether clear. Must the seller examine the
issuer's recent 1934 Act reports, if any, as well as all recent public
disclosures?'47 Moreover, is there a different standard for determining
the knowledge of controlling and noncontrolling persons?
Form 144 seems to be the key document in the policing of the rule.
146.
147.

SEC Rule 144(h).
Address by Warren F. Grienenberger, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
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The broker is deemed by the rule to know all that Form 144 contains,
and his receipt and retention of the form is iequired by the rule. As a
practical matter, the issuer and closely related persons are required to
request receipt of the form. The form therefore becomes a significant
source of common information circulated among the SEC, the broker,
the issuer, and the seller. Without it, much of the rule empirically would
be unenforceable.
G.

Treatment of Estates

As a general proposition, if either an estate or the beneficiary of
an estate is an affiliate, then both are subject to the same conditions as
other affiliates when selling restricted or unrestricted securities. When
it holds restricted securities, however, an affiliate estate is permitted to
tack the holding period of the deceased to that of its own, and the
beneficiaries of the estate, like those of a trust, are permitted double
tacking of the holding periods of the deceased and the estate.4 8 It has
been noted, however, that the rule apparently does not permit the recipient to tack the holding period of a decedent when restricted securities
have passed outside the probate estate, by virtue of joint tenancy, for
example.' A further problem is present when restricted securities pass
outside the probate estate to persons who were members of the attribution circle of the deceased. Will tacking be permitted even when the
attributional relationship existed during only a portion of the two-year
period? 50
In the determination of the amount limitation on sales, the controlling estate is subject to aggregation rules.'' The sales of the estate must
be aggregated with those of its beneficiaries within the same six months
and vice versa, and if either sells within six months of the death of the
deceased, sales by the decedent also must be included. This triple aggregation is to be distinguished from the aggregation provision on trusts,
under which only the sales of the settlor and the trust are aggregated.
Although he enjoys the same tacking privileges as does the beneficiary
of an estate, the beneficiary of a trust need not aggregate the sales of
the trust or settlor within the same six-month period. 52
If neither the estate nor its beneficiary are affiliates, the rule permits both to sell restricted securities without regard to the percentage
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

SEC Rule 144(d)(4)(G).
Address by Neil Flanagin, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
Id.
SEC Rule 144(e)(3)(E).
See SEC Rule 144(d)(4)(F), -(e)(3)(A)-(G).
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limitations or the holding period requirements. 5 3 The only conditions
to which they are subject are those relating to public information, manner of sale, and notice of proposed sales. This relaxation suggests that,
in the area of nonaffiliate estates and beneficiaries, the commission is
willing to reduce the public protection features of the rule and make
allowances for the condition of the seller. Theoretically, the concession
represents at least one change of circumstances-death-to which the
Commission will give credence.
IV.

SALES OUTSIDE RULE

144

Immersion in Rule 144 makes it difficult subsequently to free oneself of its specificity and assess its place in the regulation of securities
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. To a degree, this difficulty is a testament
to the legislative ability of the Commission in exercising its interpretive
powers. Sales of restricted and publicly acquired securities by affiliates
and private placees outside of the provisions of Rule 144 are possible,
and a brief discussion of the alternative paths through the thorny thicket
of securities regulation seems warranted.
A.

Alternative Methods of Sale by ControllingPersons

The previous presence of Rule 154 and its effective limitation on
the availability of section 4(1) made the affiliate aware of alternative
exemptions by which he could dispose of his securities without registration. These alternative exemptions from the registration provisions of
section 5 remain essentially the same, as do their relative practical
values. Available exemptions include the Regulation A offering,' the
intrastate exemption,'55 the private placement exemption, and the direct
sale exemption.
1. Regulation A.-Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act empowers the
Commission to create an exemption "if it finds that the enforcement of
this title with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public
interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering.''""
Grounded in section 3(b), Regulation A157 permits certain small public
offerings by issuers and affiliates without an expensive section 5 regis153. SEC Rule 144(d)(4)(F) & (e)(3)(E).
154. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970); SEC. Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251.262 (1971).
155. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(l 1) (1970).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
157. SEC Reg. A, 17 CFR §§ 230.251-.262 (1971).
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tration. Under the rule, as long as the total combined sales of all affiliates and the issurer do not exceed 500,000 dollars, any one affiliate can
sell up to 100,000 dollars and an affiliate estate can sell up to 500,000
dollars worth of securities within a twelve-month period.15 An affiliate
can utilize Regulation A to sell restricted as well as publicly acquired
securities. The specific conditions of Regulation A have been the subject
of much scholarly commentary, and will not be re-examined here."' It
is perhaps sufficient to say that registration under Regulation A provides the investor with roughly the same information that would be
available if the securities were registered under section 5; however, the
Regulation A procedures are less complicated and less expensive than
full registration.
2. Intrastate Exemption.-Section 3(a)(11) exempts from registration offerings to persons resident within the state where the issuer is
incorporated and is doing business.' To preserve the exemption, the
issuer must ensure that the securities come to rest in the hands of
residents of the state. If any security falls into the hands of a nonresident
before coming to rest within the state the entire distribution will lose
its exemption.' Because of the risk of inadvertent noncompliance, the
exemption is of marginal value to the issuer and controlling person.
3. Private Offering.-A third alternative for the controlling person who desires to sell publicly acquired securities is the use of a private
placement. Both a private placement and a Rule 144 sale are predicated
on the controlling person's exemption under section 4(1). The Rule 144
sale is a public offering which is not a distribution by virtue of compliance with the rule's detailed conditions. The private placement is not a
distribution because it is not a public offering. Because of the uncertainties of the application of the SEC's new definition of "distribution,"
however, it is uncertain whether a controlling person may privately
place restricted securities. Suffice it to say that if permissible at all, the
offering would have to be made in such a way as not to disturb the
original private offering in which the controlling person received his
restricted securities.
4. Direct Sale.-When selling publicly acquired securities the
controlling person's loss of the section 4(1) exemption usually is attributable to the participation of a broker who becomes a statutory underwriter. It therefore theoretically is possible for the controlling person to
158.
159.
160.
161.

Securities Act Release No. 5225 (Jan. 10, 1972).
E.g. I L. Loss, supra note 9, at 605-34.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970).
See generally I L. Loss, supra note 9, at 591-605.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

retain the 4(1) exemption by selling publicly acquired securities directly
to members of the public who purchase with investment intent without
the assistance of an underwriter.6 2 Although the sale would constitute
a distribution, the controlling person would not himself be an underwriter under section 2(11) since he would not have purchased his securities
from the issuer or another controlling person. This reasoning, however,
would not support the direct sale of restricted securities by a controlling
person since restricted securities, by definition, are purchased from an
issuer or controlling person.
Although the "direct sale exemption" has been characterized as a
"loophole" in the statutory scheme of the 1933 Act, 63 it seems practically worthless as a basis for making an unregistered distribution. Not
only is it fraught with uncertainties, but it requires of the controlling
person the nearly impossible task of effecting the distribution without
the assistance of a broker." 4
Alternative Methods of Sale'by Noncontrolling Holders of RestrictedSecurities
Prior to the adoption of Rule 144, the private placee, assuming he
had held the restricted securities for a sufficient amount of time to
establish his original investment intent, was relatively free to publicly
sell all his securities through his broker. For him there was no parallel
to the leakage requirements placed on controlling persons by Rule 154.
Consequently, the private placee was not concerned with finding alternative methods for disposing of his securities. Rule 144's continuous
restriction of the resale of restricted securities, however, has stimulated
the private placee's interest in alternative methods of sale.
1. Nonexclusivity of Rule 144.-Early drafts of Rule 144 caused
some commentators to question whether the Commission's proposed
perpetual restriction of the free alienability of privately placed securities
had violated the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Others
expressed doubt whether the Commission possessed the statutory authority to make Rule 144 the sole method by which private placees could
publicly sell their securities through brokers' transactions without registration.'65 The Commission has responded by not making Rule 144
B.

162. 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 642-43; Clark, SEC Regulation of Resale of Securities by
Controlling Persons of Non-Reporting Issuers: The Ghost of Ira Haupt Reads the "Wheat Report" and Rule 144, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 576, 596-97 (1971); Comment, supra note 22, at 485-87.
163. Cohen, supra note 75, at 1402.
164. Comment, supra note 22, at 485-87.
165. Sowards, supra note 59, at 526.
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exclusive, but reserving comment on the question of its power to do so. 166
Thus a private placee may attempt an unregistered public sale of his

securities outside the rule. The victory, however, is a pyrrhic one.
Persons who publicly offer or sell restricted securities outside the
rule are "put on notice. . . that in view of the broad remedial purposes

of the Act and of public policy which strongly supports registration, they
will have a substantial burden of proof in establishing that an exemption
. . .is available. . . and that [they] and the brokers and other persons
who participate in the transactions do so at their own risk."' 7 If this

were not a sufficient warning to daunt bold hearts, the Commission has,
in addition, withdrawn a number of prior assists. The staff will no longer
issue "no-action" letters relating to the resale of restricted securities.' "
It will, however, offer "interpretive letters" to assist persons in complying with the new rule. In addition, the change of circumgtances doctrine
has been abrogated for all sales of restricted securities. The fungibility
doctrine also has been eliminated but solely for "the purpose of the
rule.""' Moreover, the Commission has reiterated its refusal to recognize any holding period outside the rule.
By the exercise of its interpretive power, the Commission has ensured practical exclusivity. Because of the ominous consequences of
selling unregistered restricted securities as an underwriter, few will
lightly shun the safe path through the forest to hazard noncompliance.
166. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 2 (Jan. 11, 1972).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 12. For a brief discussion of the possible hardship on private placees of the staff's
refusal to issue any more "no-action" letters in respect to resale of securities see note 40 supra.
169. Securities Act Release No. 5223 at 8 (Jan. 11, 1972). Limiting the nonapplicability of
the fungibility doctrine to securities sold under Rule 144 is another administrative method of
making Rule 144 exclusive in practice. It establishes, however, an unrealistic and indefensible
double standard which cannot be justified under the statute by sound reasoning. Followed to its
logical extreme, the double standard would make it impossible to sell some securities either within
or without the rule. Assume that A owns 1,000 shares of publicly acquired stock in X Corporation.
He later purchases 2,000 shares of the same class of stock in a private offering from X. A is a
noncontrolling person. Can A now sell his original 1,000 shares outside Rule 144? If the nonapplicability of the fungibility doctrine is limited solely to the rule, A could not sell the 1,000 shares
outside the rule since fungibility would cause them to bear the same taint as the privately placed
securities. Can A, therefore, sell his 1,000 shares within the rule? Since within the confines of the
rule fungibility is inapplicable, A's 1,000 shares are nonrestricted, noncontrol securities and, therefore, are not covered by Rule 144. Even if A wanted to sell the 1,000 shares within the rule, there
would be no provision permitting him to do so without resurrecting the fungibility doctrine. Thus
A becomes the victim of a gap in administrative planning created by the Commission's zealous
attempt to discourage sales outside Rule 144. The only meaningful solution is for the Commission
to permit A to sell his 1,000 shares outside the rule without restriction. This step would necessitate
the complete repudiation of the fungibility doctrine, within and without Rule 144. A would have
to maintain two pools of securities, one which could be sold freely outside Rule 144 and the second
which would consist of restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144.
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The few that do so will be hard pressed to find a broker willing to risk
liability and loss of license in order to assist them. The precious few who
find a willing broker, however, should comply as closely as possible with
the policy of the rule, particularly as related to the nature of a distribution, in order to minimize their potential liability.' The burden of
showing the availability of an exemption is on the one seeking the
exemption, and for one who has rejected the officially approved path,
the burden is likely to be heavily borne. Even if the would-be seller has
a strong statutory argument, he may ultimately face a court reluctant
language, if to
to apply the "strangulating literalism" of the statutory
171
do so would materially compromise the Act's policy.
2.

The Use of Regulation A.-As previously noted, the control-

ling person is free to sell restricted securities under Regulation A. The
regulation has been expanded to include expressly sales of restricted
securities by nonaffiliates. Amended Regulation A permits a noncontrolling person to sell up to 100,000 dollars worth of securities within a
twelve-month period as long as the aggregate of these sales by all noncontrolling persons does not exceed 500,000 dollars . 72 Moreover, these
the 500,000 dollar maximum placed
sales will not be counted towards
173
on the issuer and its affiliates.
The extent to which this amendment is a viable alternative to Rule
144 for the private placee is questionable, since his lack of control will
make it difficult for him to persuade the issuer to undergo the abbreviated registration required by the regulation. Because only the issuer can
file a registration statement under Regulation A, the Commission has
encouraged private placees to negotiate for a promise that the issuer will
register the securities if a later sale is desired. The private placee's lack
of leverage, however, may impede his ability to bargain for such registration covenants. Even if an agreement were reached, the placee would
be expected in most cases to bear much of the expense of registration.
In addition, there exists some question whether, in the event of the
issuer's breach, the placee could insist on specific performance of the
74
agreement.
3.

The Use of Negotiated Transactions-NewRule 237.-A final

means for the noncontrolling person to dispose of his restricted securities is provided by recently promulgated Rule 237.115
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Wander, supra note 82, at 961.
Cf SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Securities Act Release No. 5225 (Jan. 10, 1972).
Id.
Address by Burton R. Rissman, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
Securities Act Release No. 5224 (Jan. 10, 1972).
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Adopted under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, 76 Rule 237 exempts
from section 5177 privately negotiated resales of restricted securities by
persons other than the issuer, controlling persons, or broker-dealers, if
four conditions are satisfied: (1) the issuer is a domestic organization;
(2) the issuer has at least a five-year active business history; (3) the
securities sold have been beneficially owned and fully paid for, if purchased, for at least five years prior to sale; (4) the securities are sold in
a bona fide negotiated transaction otherwise than through a broker or
dealer. In contrast to the provisions of Rule 144(d)(2), 78 Rule 237's "full
purchase price" requirement does not provide for payments by promissory notes or other obligations. Under Rule 237, therefore, the full
purchase price is not deemed to have been paid, and hence the five-year
holding period does not start until such obligations have been fully
paid.' 7 ' In addition, Rule 237(b) imposes a quantitative limit on the
amount of securities that can be sold in negotiated transactions. Sales
under the rule cannot exceed in any one year period "the lesser of the
gross proceeds from the sale of one percent of the securities of the class
outstanding or 50,000 dollars in aggregate gross proceeds."'80 In determining the amount of securities that can be sold in any year under Rule
237, sales pursuant to Regulation A and sales under Rule 144 are aggregated.' At least ten days before the sale a Form 237 Notice of Proposed Sale must be filed with the Regional Office of the Commission
for the region where the issuer's principal business is conducted. The
purchaser of restricted2 securities under Rule 237 acquires stock that is
no longer restricted.1
Rule 237 provides an exemption for the noncontrolling person who
owns restricted securities when the issuer does not satisfy all of the
176. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1970).
177. It should be noted that the rule does not exempt the sales from the antifraud provisions
of the securities acts. Securities Act Release No. 5224 (Jan. 10, 1972).
178. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
179. SEC Rule 237(a)(3), Securities Act Release No. 5224 (Jan. 10, 1972).

180. Id. at 237(b).
181.

SEC Rule 237(b). Compare this provision with Rule 144(e)(3)(G), which provides that

securities sold under Regulation A or in a private offering under § 4(2) are not aggregated for
purposes of determining the amount of securities that can be sold under Rule 144. Moreover, there
is no express requirement that Rule 237 sales be aggregated with Rule 144 sales in determining
the amount of restricted securities that can be sold under Rule 144 by a noncontrolling seller. The
wording of Rule 237(b)'s aggregation requirement for "securities sold during such year pursuant
to any other exemption under section 3(b) . . . ." fails to limit the aggregation to securities of
the same class or even securities of the same issuer. When contrasted with the remainder of the
sentence, which aggregates only "securities of the same class sold in reliance upon Rule 144," the
omission would seem to impose a harsh requirement on holders of restricted securities who have
sold securities under Regulation A during the same one-year period.
182. Securities Act Release No. 5224 (Jan. 10, 1972).
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conditions of Rule 144. The Commission's objective is to avoid unduly
restricting the liquidity of these investments. Implicitly, Rule 237 is a
recognition of the practical exclusivity of Rule 144 and represents an
effort to give some relief to the private placee.
C. Sales Following Reclassifications, Mergers, Consolidations, and

Sales of Assets-ProposedRule 145
A full exposition of the "no-sale" theory of Rule 133 is beyond the

scope of this inquiry;'8 the adoption of Rule 144, however, has forced
some changes in the operation of Rule 133, principally in the interrelationship of the leakage provisions of the two rules, which should be
considered. Under what circumstances must the former shareholder of
the constituent or acquired corporation who wishes to sell newly ac-

quired securities in the surviving enterprise comply with the provisions
of Rule 144, and under what circumstances must he comply with Rule
133? In an attempt to dispel mounting confusion, the SEC recently has
proposed new Rule 145,184 designed to replace present Rule 133.1"
1. Interlacingof Rule 133 andRule 144.-Rule 133 provides that

for purposes of section 5,186 no "sale," "offer to sell," or "offer for sale"7
is deemed to have occurred when a plan for certain reclassifications,1
mergers, consolidations, or sales of assets in exchange for stock of the
acquiring corporation is submitted to the shareholders of the constituent
183. The theory has received extensive comment elsewhere. See generally I L. Loss, supra
note 9, at 518-42; WHEAT REPORT, supra note 4, at 251-96; Comment, Recent Developments in
the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933: ProposedRevision of Rule 133, 47 CALIF.
L. REV. 112 (1959); Purcell, A Considerationof the "No-Sale" Theory Under the Securities Act
of 1933, 24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 254 (1958); Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule
133, 13 Bus. LAW. 78 (1957); Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, 16
WEST. RES. L. REv. 11 (1964).
184. Securities Act Release No. 5246 (May 2, 1972).
185. Id.
186. Rule 133's "no-sale" theory does not apply to the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and
1934 acts. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); 1 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 52428.
187. There are 3 kinds of reclassifications: (1) those accomplished by the solicitation of
security holders to voluntarily exchange their securities for reclassified securities; (2) those resulting
from a reorganization either under the Bankruptcy Act or under corresponding state law; and (3)
those accomplished by amendment of the corporate charter. Rule 133 does not address the first 2
kinds, which are generally exempt from § 5 by either § 3(a)(10) or § 3(a)(1 1) of the Act. Section
3(a)(9) exempts reclassifications of the third variety if no paid solicitors are used. If paid solicitors
are used, the reclassification may still be exempt under § 3(a)(10). Rule 133 is limited to those
reclassifications in the third category and is available for reclassifications of the third category that
are not otherwise exempt and are executed pursuant to a plan that relates to corporate stock and
is required to be submitted to a vote of the shareholders. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 4, at 28891.
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corporation or of the corporation reclassifying its securities.188 The rule,
therefore, provides an effective exemption from registration for securities issued in a reorganization but not for their subsequent sale by
shareholders. In the case of a merger, consolidation or asset sale, the
shareholders can be classified as follows: (1) Shareholders who are controlling persons of the constituent corporation but who do not become
controlling persons of the acquiring corporation; (2) shareholders who
are controlling persons of the constituent company and who become
controlling persons in the surviving enterprise; (3) noncontrolling shareholders who held privately placed securities in the constituent corporation which were exchanged for securities of the acquiring corporation;
or (4) noncontrolling shareholders who held publicly acquired securities
of the constituent corporation which were exchanged for securities of the
acquiring corporation.
A shareholder within the first category, who was a controlling
person of the constituent company but who does not become a controlling person of the surviving enterprise is deemed to be a statutory underwriter if the securities of the issuer are acquired with a view to distribution.'"8 Thus, the shareholder must take the securities of the acquiring
corporation with an investment intent and retain the securities for a
holding period commensurate with that intent. After the original investment intent is demonstrated, the controlling person of the constituent
corporation would be as free to sell all his securities under section 4(1)
as other noncontrolling persons of the acquiring corporation. In addition, during the holding period, Rule 133(d) provides for leakage sales
under a one percent scheme similar to that contained in rescinded Rule
154.190 The purpose of these provisions is to place the controlling person
of the constituent corporation in essentially the same position before
and after the Rule 133 transaction. 9 ' Before the adoption of Rule 144,
this objective substantially was achieved by the parallel structures of the
188.

SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a) (1971).

189. Id., § 230.133(c).
190. Id., § 230.133(d).
191. There is a distinction between the statutory bases upon which a controlling person of a
constituent corporation and a controlling person of the issuer are subject to loss of their § 4(l)
exemptions. Rule 133 permits the controlling person of the constituent corporation to make limited
sales without becoming a statutory underwriter. If the controlling person of the constituent corporation sells his newly acquired securities without complying with Rule 133, he will be deemed to
have acquired the securities from the issuer in a nonregistered transaction with a view to distribution. On the other hand, the controlling person of the issuer is concerned with his broker, and not
himself, becoming a statutory underwriter. If his broker becomes an underwriter, then the controlling person will lose his § 4(1) exemption because of his broker's involvement in the sale. See notes
57 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
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Rule 154 and Rule 133 leakage provisions. The adoption of Rule 144,
however, has destroyed this parallelism and has created a disequilibrium
that will continue as long as Rule 133 remains in effect.
A shareholder within the second category, who was a controlling
person of the constituent corporation and who becomes a controlling
person of the issuer also is deemed to be a statutory underwriter by Rule
133(c) if the securities are taken with a view to distribution. That he is
now a controlling person of the issuer, however, places him in a different
position from the shareholder in the first category. The shareholder in
the second category is covered by the leakage provisions of Rule 133(d)
and Rule 144. This should be one instance in which the nonexclusivity
of Rule 144 is practically meaningful, for the controlling person should
be able to opt for the more relaxed requirements of Rule 133.
A shareholder in the third category, who exchanges restricted securities for securities of the issuer, holds the new securities subject to
the same restrictions that attached to his restricted securities in the
constituent corporation.1 2 Rule 144, however, does not provide specifically for tacking of the holding periods of the securities given up and
the securities received in the transaction. This omission should not prevent the shareholder from tacking since tacking appears necessary to
accomplish the regulatory objective of placing him in the same position
after the Rule 133 transaction as he was previously.
A shareholder who falls within the fourth category-who exchanges publicly acquired securities in the constitutent corporation for
securities in the surviving corporation-is as free to sell his newly acquired securities under section 4(1) as he was prior to the reorganization. Rule 133(c) is not addressed to noncontrolling shareholders of the
constituent corporation; therefore he has no fear of becoming a statutory underwriter.
2. Proposed Rule 145.-In response to longstanding dissatisfaction with the "no-sale" concept of Rule 133 and to the newly created
need for elimination of the disparities between Rule 144 and Rule 133,
the Commission recently has proposed Rule 145193 and a number of
related rules and amendments." 4 The proposed rule would abolish the
192. Address by Donald Schwartz, Northwestern, Mar. 27, 1972.
193. Securities Act Release No. 5246 (May 2, 1972).
194. Related proposals include Proposed Rule 153A (defining "preceded by a prospectus"
in section 5(b)(2) as "the sending of a prospectus, prior to the vote of security holders . . . to all
security holders of record . . . entitled to vote"); Proposed Revisions of Form S-14 (providing a
"wrap around" prospectus in the form of a proxy meeting the requirements of § 14 of the Exchange
Act); Proposed Amendment of Rule 14a-2(d) under the Exchange Act (providing that the exemption from the proxy rules does not apply to solicitations involved in a Rule 145-type transaction);
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"'no-sale" concept and therefore would require an issuer in an otherwise
nonexempt reclassification, merger, consolidation, or sale of assets in
exchange for securities to undergo registration. To this extent the proposed rule is consistent with prior proposals. 95 The proposal goes on,
however, to impose an unprecedented restriction on resales by shareholders who receive securities of the issuer. Under the proposed rule,
any shareholder, whether or not in control of the constituent corporation, who takes more than a set percentage amount of securities in the
surviving enterprise-roughly the same percentage set out in Rule
144(e)'"I-is deemed to be an underwriter if he offers or sells the registered securities acquired in a Rule 145 transaction. The only exemption
for such shareholder is a sale in accordance with the provisions of Rule
144(c) (Current Public Information), (e) (Limitation on Amount of
Securities Sold), (f) (Manner of Sale), and (g) (Brokers' Transactions),
in which case the proposed rule provides that the shareholder will not
be deemed a statutory underwriter.
Although one apparent intention of proposed Rule 145 is to ensure
public protection by bringing more sellers within the requirements of
Rule 144, the wisdom of the rule's restrictions and even the power of
the Commission to impose them are questionable. The 1933 Act was
never intended to inhibit the free and open trading of securities received
19 7
by noncontrolling persons pursuant to a registered public offering.
Although a literal reading of section 2(11) might support the finding of
underwriter status for such persons, this sort of interpretation was
clearly not intended. The imposition of the restrictions of Rule 144(c),
(e), (f) and (g) on noncontrolling persons who are not private placees is
an unprecedented restriction on the alienability of securities.
To the extent that Rule 145 is an effort to establish the same
and Proposed Amendment of Rule 14a-6 under the Exchange Act (providing that both the proxy
rules and the registration requirements will apply to material filed with respect to Rule 145
transactions). Securities Act Release No. 5246 (May 2, 1972).
195. Securities Act Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969).
196. The percentage amount is described as follows:
(1) If securities of the same class are admitted to trading on a national securities exchange, the
lesser of (A) one percent of the shares or other units of the class outstanding as shown by the
registration statement, or (B) the average weekly reported volume of trading in such securities on
all securities exchanges during the 4 calendar weeks preceding the effective date of such statement;
(2) If securities of the same class are not traded on a national securities exchange but are traded
in the over-the-counter market, one percent of the shares or other units of the class outstanding as

shown by the registration statement; or
(3) I f on the effective date of the registration statement there is no public trading market for the
securities of the class covered by the registration statement, 5% of the shares of other units of such
class registered. Proposed Rule 145(c). Securities Act Release No. 5246 (May 2, 1972).
197. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
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equilibrium between Rule 145 and Rule 144 that previously existed
between Rule 133 and Rule 154, the rule goes much further than is
necessary. In explaining the leakage provisions of Rule 133 and their
relationship to Rule 154, the Commission stated that "in a situation
where a trading market may be availed of by other persons receiving
securities in a Rule 133 transaction, it would be less than realistic to
permit a controlling person of a constituent company less latitude in a
trading transaction than he had before consummation of the Rule 133
transaction and, and indeed, less than a controlling person of the issuer
itself."'' 8 Rule 145 clearly violates the spirit of this reasoning by permitting the noncontrolling security holder of the constituent corporation far
less latitude after the Rule 145 transaction than he had prior to the
transaction. Indeed, the noncontrolling person of the constituent corporation may have less latitude than the noncontrolling person of the
acquiring corporation although sales by either person present the same
risk to the investor.
V. EVALUATION
Rule 144 heralds a dramatic change in the treatment of resales by
private placees and to a lesser degree resales by controlling persons. It
also has introduced a more thorough mechanism for enforcement. That
mechanism makes possible a monitoring of the gradual flow of privately
placed and control securities to the public. The effectiveness of this
system rests upon the interdependence of the issuer, the broker, and the
seller in securing their several exemptions. The key instrument is Form
144, which each of the parties has a substantial interest in having circulated among themselves. When the activity of any one of the parties
triggers the objective scrutiny of another, the activity becomes more
visible and enforcement of the rule is more effective. On the other hand,
when the activities of any party are not monitored, enforcement of the
rule is more difficult. It is, for example, difficult for a broker to discover
if a private placee properly has accounted for tolling periods in which
the placee has had shorts or puts outstanding. The responsibility for
making tolling adjustments is on the seller alone and his failure to do
so may suffer from low visibility. Similarly, the prohibition against
solicitation poses serious enforcement problems, since a solicited buyer
may well be willing to sign a statement at the time of the sale that he
was not solicited.
The most innovative element of Rule 144 is its imposition of a
198.

Securities Act Release No. 4248 (1960).
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permanent restriction on the public resale of privately placed securities.
This feature of the rule, more than any other, raises the question of the
Commission's power as the administrative agency of the Securities Act.
Reduced to its simplest form, Rule 144 has altered the position of the
private placee within the statutory framework by a reinterpretation of
section 2(11). By the shift of interpretive emphasis from "view to" to a
newly defined "distribution," the Commission has completely reconstructed the statutory scheme of the 1933 Act as it bears on resales by
private placees. The change is so fundamental that it is difficult to
characterize Rule 144 as anything other than administrative legislation.
It is at least questionable whether Congress intended the power to define
terms within the Act to be a springboard for such expansive legislative
action. The case might be different if the new definition of "distribution" were reasonably within the context of section 2(11). Arguably,
however, it is not, when applied to the private placee. In imposing a
permanent restriction on the private placee, the rule fails to recognize
that a statutorily required relationship between an issuer and the person
making a distribution must exist before that person can be characterized
as a statutory underwriter. Section 2(11) requires that a person take
from an issuer with a view to distribution, offer or sell for an issuer, or
participate in any such undertaking. The section does not say that anyone who makes a "distribution" at any point in the future is an underwriter. A private placee who has fully paid for his securities and has held
them for ten years before publicly selling could hardly be said to be
selling those securities "for the issuer." Nor could it realistically be said
that he took with a "view to" distribution. If the securities sold are in
excess of the one percent quota, however, the practical exclusivity of
Rule 144 creates the distinct possibility that the seller will be labeled a
statutory underwriter under section 2(11). On the other hand, the underlying policy objectives of Rule 144 essentially are sound. The rule partially satisfies the recognized need for a continuous disclosure system
through the integration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. It is highly unlikely,
therefore, that any court will find that the Commission has exceeded its
statutory power in promulgating Rule 144. The Commission nevertheless should be conscious of the effect that these new restrictions on
private placements will have, and if experience shows the rule to be too
restrictive, the Commission should be prompt in seeking remedial measures. One industry that may be restricted excessively is that of
institutional investors, who receive a large amount of debt securities
through private offerings.' For these private placees, the rule's permis199.

Note 9 supra.
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sion to sell one percent of a class of debt securities in an unsolicited
broker's transaction is no permission at all if the securities are thinly
traded, as they usually are. This predicament has caused one commentator to suggest that when applied to the resale of privately placed debt
securities, the limitations imposed by the one percent rule "render the
Rule useless as it stands. 2 0 If this statement proves to be correct, Rule
144 will have a substantially detrimental effect on small corporations
that long have relied upon the private placement of debt securities as a
primary method of raising needed capital.
Finally, it should be noted that in its effort to be concise the Commission may have risked some of the beneficial flexibility afforded by
prior vagaries. It is possible, for example, that the rule's provisions
relating to donees and trust beneficiaries could be utilized to violate the
spirit of the rule. 201 In anticipation of such conduct, the release announcing Rule 144 provides that "the rule shall not be available to any individual or entity with respect to any transaction which, although in technical
compliance with the provisions of the rule, is part of a plan by such
individual or entity to distribute or redistribute securities to the public. ' 202 If used with proper restraint, this clause could provide needed
flexibility. If used immoderately, it could destroy confidence in the
workability of the rule and restore previous confusion.
PAUL LOWE SLOAN III
200. Address by Adrian Leiby, Saloman Brothers, Seminar on Private Placements, Nov. 17,
1971. The remarks by Mr. Leiby were addressed to Proposed Rule 144. The one percent feature
of the proposed rule, however, remains the same.
201. The aggregation provision relating to donees requires the grouping of amounts sold by
the donor and the donee. It does not require aggregation among donees. It would be possible,
therefore, for a single donee to give one percent to each of a number of donees who could then

resell their entire amount so long as they do not act in concert. Rule 144 (a)(3)(C). Similarly,
aggregation when applied to trusts is operative only between the settlor and the trust and does not
include sales by beneficiaries of the trust. Rule 144(e)(3)(D).
202. Securities Act Release 5223, at 13 (Jan. 11, 1972).

